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The thesis consists of three empirical articles, with each paper focusing on the specific domain 
of public understanding of science research field, namely racial disparities in civic scientific 
literacy, public support for the pro-environmental governmental policies, and public perception 
of scientists’ trustworthiness. 
Chapter 2 employs the General Social Survey data to study the role of racial social identity 
and racial ingroup evaluation in shaping the science literacy gap between whites and African 
Americans. In Chapter 3, the European Social Survey Round 8 data is used to explore the 
relationship between public support for the welfare state and the environmental state. Finally, 
Chapter 4 utilizes the experimental data collected via Prolific to answer the question as to 
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1. General introduction 
1.1 Thesis background 
I remember that time during my undergraduate degree when I first got introduced to the 
research field of science and technology studies. The idea of social researchers turning their 
heads to academia and scrutinizing how scientific knowledge is constructed via negotiations in 
the laboratories and universities – as Latour did in his famous book ‘Science in Action: How 
to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society’ (1987) – immediately caught my attention 
and took a top position in my subjective list of the most interesting and attractive topics that 
the social science can offer to a young scholar. 
However, as time went by, what sparked my curiosity even more was the way how academia 
and scientific research is perceived by the public. Do people see scientists as some sort of 
intellectually advanced distant demigods who bring pure beneficence to the society, or are they 
considered more as down-to-earth humans that are prone to the same kind of biases and errors 
as anyone else and that the society should keep a watchful eye on? What does this depend on? 
Why some people tend to be immersed into the scientific agenda following the latest news and 
having an active stance in discussing science issues, while others say that these matters are too 
complicated for them to deal with and that there is only a hardly perceptible effect that science 
negotiations have on their day-to-day life? 
These questions puzzled me a lot and I started delving more and more into the relevant literature 
to see how the idea of studying public attitudes to science emerged and reinforced itself, what 
is the current state-of-the-art research, and what can be done further. Perhaps as it is with all 
research fields and all disciplines, I soon discovered that the agenda of studies on public 
understanding of science has come a long way too, and the premises and intentions behind the 
very first nationally representative survey of public attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge about 
2 
 
science conducted by Stephen Withey in the late 50s (1959) were grounded in a research 
paradigm that would seem rather shallow and even naïve today. 
Looking back at the history of public understanding of science, Bauer (2009) identifies three 
landmark discourses - or paradigms, as he calls them – that dominated the field in their 
respective time, each having its own core concepts, study rationales, and research field 
boundaries. 
The first period that lasted for roughly 25 years from the 60s to mid-80s went down in history 
as an era of research on civic science literacy (Shen 1975; Miller 1983). During that time, 
scientific literacy, broadly defined as ‘the ability of the individual to read about, comprehend, 
and express an opinion on scientific matters’ (Miller 1983: 30) has become a matter of 
increased interest and concern both for scientists and policy-makers. The reason for this lies in 
the growing awareness that science, however distant it might have seemed from the public at 
that point, did not constitute an autonomous impenetrable entity that could be guided and 
regulated exclusively by its own rules without any reference to the general public. Just the 
opposite, there was growing evidence that scientists and policy-makers can face a collective 
response from the public on a variety of societally significant matters - nuclear energy, 
vaccinations, climate change just to name a few – and that this response oftentimes might be 
driven by the lack of understanding of the science behind the disputed matter. 
Thus, the public understanding of science research of that time got its motivation from the idea 
that, if the public has to be listened to, then it would be better to ensure that the public voice is 
based on a decent level of understanding of science, rather than on all kinds of easily spreading 
misconceptions, misinformation, and conspiracy theories. For that, the level of public 
knowledge of science should be carefully measured in the first place, and, if being low, the 
public should then be educated to express its views and concerns more informatively. 
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The implicit assumption that educating the public can make it more supportive for various 
scientific endeavors has become a matter of explicit scrutiny as the research on public and 
science progressed from the stage of ‘science literacy’ to ‘public understanding’ in the mid-
80s. Confirming the ‘the more you know, the more you love it’ (Bauer 2009: 224) idea has 
now become a cherished goal for researchers in public understanding of science, which, in its 
turn, reflected the ongoing inability of scientists and policy-makers to abandon the public 
deficit model of science communication. 
Two decades of search for the relationship between textbook science knowledge and attitude 
to science were neatly summarized in a meta-analysis by Allum and colleagues (2008), and the 
conclusion was unequivocal: if the relationship between those two concepts exists at all, it is 
rather weak, and science knowledge surely cannot account for a large fraction of variation in 
science attitudes. Hence, the rationalist agenda of public understanding of science has not found 
its confirmation – for good or for bad, the questions of how the public perceives science and 
why trust in science is constantly decreasing appeared to be by far more complex and 
multidimensional than it was originally pictured. 
This finding has had a dramatic effect on science communication, prompting scientists and 
policymakers to rethink the way they communicate with the public. The juxtaposition of 
science and society was no more a valid option as it could only lead to the gradual decline of 
the authority of science and enhance its incapability of effectively implementing much needed 
scientific interventions – the repercussion of this confidence crisis could be witnessed up to 
this day (Kabat 2017). 
In this vein, science communication started its drift from the ‘science vs. society’ agenda 
towards the ‘science-in-society’ (Bauer 2009: 222) one, that advocated for establishing a more 
equitable dialogue between science and the public and taking away from scientists and 
policymakers their previously indisputable right to make technocratic decisions and impose 
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science policy without external control and accountability. The key questions of this period of 
research revolve around the topics of public engagement in science policy-shaping (Stilgoe et 
al. 2014), collaborative research, and the ways to restore public trust by democratising 
scientific research and making its principles and practices more transparent to the wider 
audience (Haerlin and Parr 1999). 
Before coming to the PUS field, the acknowledgment of the multiplicity of expertise and 
various ‘epistemic cultures’ (Cetina 1999) that scientists and lay citizens produce has first 
become a matter of close scrutiny in the related field of science and technology studies. Unlike 
PUS research field that mostly adheres to quantitative methodology and seeks for describing 
the relationship between the concepts using large-scale survey data, or establishing causal 
effects in the experimental setting, science and technologies studies mostly adopt the 
qualitative research methodology. This allows for more in-depth understanding of the subtleties 
of scientific knowledge construction process, and it is very common for STS researchers to 
come to the laboratories or other academic institutions, blend in with the personnel and observe 
the social dynamic on a micro level. 
Undergoing the evolutionary path from studying science ethos (Merton 1942) to assigning 
agency to inanimate objects (Callon 1986, Latour 1987), the latest developments in this STS 
field known under the name of actor-network theory (Latour 1996) indeed revolutionized the 
way the construction of scientific knowledge is theorized. According to this theory, scientists, 
very much like politicians, form alliances with other actors to facilitate the development and 
spread of new technologies, either one thinks of vaccines (Latour 1999) or electric cars (Callon 
1987). From this perspective, restoring public trust in science can be considered as a primary 
goal for science policymakers if they wish not to face an ardent resistance – however reasonable 
and knowledgeable it might ne - when new technologies are about to enter the market. 
5 
 
While the history of research on public understanding of science might seem as a linear 
trajectory from research on science literacy to research on public engagement in science, it 
would not be entirely correct to say so. The overall agenda and the way how research questions 
are being posed indeed changes, yet the arsenal of concepts that underpin the research 
accumulates and recycles everything that has been of use in the past. Over the almost 60 years 
of research on public understanding of sciences, some questions have received quite enough 
attention and can be considered well scrutinized i.e. the relationship between science literacy 
and attitudes to science (Allum et al. 2008) or trust in science and scientists (Krause et al. 
2019), while others are still in the making i.e. public attitude to artificial intelligence and robots 
(Zhang and Dafoe 2020). 
Hence, please consider this thesis as a humble attempt to advance the knowledge about the 
public perception of science and scientists in the facets that I felt I was able to contribute to 
most fruitfully over these four vivid years of my PhD degree. Even though the thesis consists 
of three self-contained articles tapping into various domains within the public understanding 
of science research field, yet I would argue that there is a general thread that stitches together 
all the papers. The bonding thread becomes clear when we think about the questions that 
inevitably arise in mind when pondering whether the public should be (and how) included in 
the dialogue on science policy shaping. 
When debating the extent to which lay citizens should be granted a voice in this regard, what 
might matter first at a surface level is the knowledgeability of people in the context of a 
discussed issue. While the prevailing notion is that engaging citizens into science policy 
discussion, overall brings more societal benefits than harm (e.g. Stilgoe et al. 2014), and this 
is a wholesome thing to do in terms of promoting accountability and transparency of science 
(Fuller 2011), researchers still argue who are those most proactive citizens that are willing to 
participate in negotiations (Powerll et al. 2011) and whether their level of knowledgeability 
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and overall awareness is high enough to contribute to the discussion productively. This is where 
the concept of science literacy kicks in. Being unequally distributed among the population 
(Allum et al. 2018), some people report lower levels of science literacy than others depending 
on their sociodemographic profile. Thus, Chapter 2 of this thesis builds upon this fact and 
joins the discussion about socioeconomic disparities in science literacy approaching it from the 
perspective of racial inequality. 
As a disclaimer, while some researchers question the validity of the civic scientific literacy 
scale and argue that the items tapping into the acquaintance with the basic scientific facts 
should be substituted with the items measuring the knowledge of how the scientific institution 
actually works (Bauer et al. 2000), there is still a dominant tendency in recent polls and surveys 
to use the knowledge scales that are primarily based on the items delving into the basic 
knowledge of well-established scientific facts (Funk and Goo 2015; NSF 2018), and I adopt 
this approach too. 
The second thought to consider when thinking about laypeople interacting with science policy 
is public trust in science. As broad as the question of public trust in the scientific community 
might sound to a general reader, it boils down to a simple branching: it is either people believe 
that the scientists being left unaccounted for are doing their job in such a way that increases 
the societal good and brings no or least possible harm, or – much within a flow of Beck’s ‘risk 
society’ idea (Beck 992) – people tend to believe that terrible things might happen if scientists 
are left unattended. The body of polls and surveys on public trust in science is voluminous (e.g. 
Krause et al. 2019), yet not all the facets of this topic have received equal attention. What is 
left somewhat understudied – and what became the research topic in Chapter 4 of this thesis 
– is what sociodemographic and work-related attributes of scientists matter in terms of their 




Chapter 3 of the dissertation is devoted to the very topic of public support for science policy. 
The world we live in has reached such an ultimate level of complexity that the challenges we 
face as humanity and the potentially detrimental consequences they might bring about in the 
future require us to act immediately. Perhaps the most serious challenge that must be dealt with 
is global climate change and its environmental, economic, and societal aftermath. There is a 
well-developed body of literature on factors of public acceptance of climate change (e.g. 
Hornsey et al. 2016) and governmental policies related to climate change (e.g. Poortinga et al. 
2012). Building upon this evidence, my goal in this chapter was to add to the discussion from 
the fairly untrodden perspective and link public support for environmental policies with public 
support for the welfare state policies to establish whether public opinion about long-term 
environmental and short-term societal risks is homogenous or not. 
 
1.2 Chapter overview 
In Chapter 2 I and Prof. Nick Allum employ the data from the General Social Survey (GSS) 
to study the role of race-based social identity and race-based ingroup evaluation in shaping 
racial disparities in science literacy. This chapter builds upon the existing literature (e.g. Plutzer 
2013; Allum et al. 2018; Anderson 2015; NASEM 2016) that has so far studied the racial gap 
in science literacy mostly from the perspective of educational and economic disadvantages. 
However, the scholarship suggests that racial disparities tend to persist even when the most 
commonly used covariates such as education, religiosity, age, place of living, etc. are accounted 
for. 
We, therefore, approach this issue from another perspective by inspecting how the strength of 
racial self-identification and racial ingroup evaluation can impact science literacy among 
African Americans compared to the white population. Employing the social identity theory 
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(Tajfel 1974, 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986) as a theoretical framework, we have shown that 
the subjective perception of social closeness with the racial ingroup does not contribute to the 
explanation of the racial disparities in science literacy; however, there is evidence to suggest 
that the favourable ingroup evaluation is positively associated with African Americans’ scores 
on science knowledge scale, compared to whites. 
The novelty of this work comes from the fact that the topic of racial disparities in science 
literacy has not been studied previously from the perspective of racial social identity. 
Employing high-quality survey data, we were able to investigate the role of social identity and 
ingroup evaluation in shaping science knowledge among African Americans and whites, and 
thus advance the long-lasting discussion about the race-based differences in the uptake of 
science. The results of the analysis provoke a vital discussion as to what is the role of 
historically induced and socially absorbed distrust to science among African Americans in 
repelling them from endorsing science knowledge and how this can be overcome given the new 
empirical evidence that is provided in the chapter. 
In Chapter 3 I use the data coming from the European Social Survey Round 8 (2016) to study 
factors of public support for the environmental state (Meadowcroft 2008, Duit 2016) i.e. 
government measures aimed at curbing societal and economic risks related to supranational 
environmental threats such as global warming. The specific focus of this chapter is on 
disentangling the relationship between public support for the welfare and environmental states 
when taking into account other important predictors of pro-environmental attitudes such as 
values, climate change belief, and environmental concern. Employing the Value-Belief-Norm 
theory (Stern et al. 1999, Stern 2000) and running the structural equation model I show that 
people endorsing a positive view about government-driven welfare measures also tend to 
support state intervention into the environmental realm, although the magnitude of this effect 
is somewhat lower than that of factors coming from the Value-Belief-Norm theory. 
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The novelty of this work comes from combining the notions of public support for the welfare 
and environmental states in a single empirical model. While there is plenty of theoretical 
literature (e.g. Duit et al. 2016; Gough 2016) on how the emergence of the environmental state 
is connected to the development of the welfare state, none of the papers has so far explored 
whether public views of these two entities are related to each other or not. Wrapping up the 
paper within the Value-Belief-Norm framework that has been precisely developed to explain 
pro-environmental behavior and attitudes ensures that all essential factors have been accounted 
for when disentangling the relationship between the welfare and environmental states. The 
results of the analysis provoke a discussion as to what extent the measures aimed at promoting 
public support for the pro-environmental policies should rely on activating people’s 
environmental identity, and whether it is possible to approach this objective by appealing to 
the notion of the government responsibility in regulating and curbing collective risks (e.g. such 
as the one we are witnessing currently with the case of COVID-19). 
In Chapter 4 I and co-authors Prof. Nick Allum and Dr. Burak Sonmez develop and carry out 
a conjoint experiment via Prolific online participant recruitment engine to explore what are the 
scientist’s attributes that the general public tends to rely on most when it comes to making 
judgments about scientist’s credibility and trustworthiness. By invoking the social identity 
theory (Stern et al. 1999, Stern 2000) and inspecting the effects of scientist’s race/ethnicity, 
sex, political leaning, scientific field, and domain of work, we show that the political ideology 
of scientist plays the most important role in shaping his/her perceived trustworthiness, with 
Independent scientists being treated as more preferable compared to those leaning either 
towards the Democrat or Republican side of the spectrum. Moreover, we find that work-related 
attributes such as the scientific field and work domain (government, industry, or university) 
matter more in terms of scientist’s preferability compared to their basic socio-demographic 
traits i.e. sex and race/ethnicity. 
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The novelty of this research comes from its specific focus on the public preferences for 
scientists and their trustworthiness as opposed to the abundant existing research on trust in 
institutionalized science per se (e.g. Krause et al. 2019) and public perception of controversial 
scientific topics e.g. global warming (Hamilton et al. 2015) or vaccines (Larson et al. 2016). 
We were able to show that when disentangling the complex relationship between science and 
the public, the expert claims made by scientists cannot be scrutinized separately from the public 
image that the scientists happen to hold as their perceived trustworthiness as experts goes far 
beyond the mere contents of the message that they convey. This chapter thus advances the 
discussion around the proclaimed failure of the scientific community to signal to the wider 
audience the integrity of their research (Jamieson et al. 2019) by revealing what are the 
cognitive heuristics and implicit biases that the public holds about scientists with various 
sociodemographic profiles and working backgrounds. 
 
1.2.1 Publication plan 
Chapter 2 is co-authored with Prof. Nick Allum and is currently under review for publication 
in Public Understanding of Science. 
Chapter 3 is single-authored and will be submitted to the Environmental Politics. 
Chapter 4 is co-authored with Prof. Nick Allum and Dr. Burak Sonmez and will be submitted 
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2. Social Identity and Racial Disparities in Science Literacy 
 
Research on African-Americans’ relationship with science, while relatively sparse, in general 
suggests higher levels of alienation than among their white counterparts, whether in the form 
of less positive attitudes to science, or lower scientific literacy. In this paper we examine the 
role of racial social identity and ingroup evaluation as putative mechanisms that produce these 
disparities. Race-based social identity could be associated with attitudes to and engagement 
with science if the social gains from science are seen as inequitably distributed along racial 
dimensions. We use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), pooled over three waves, as 
the basis for our investigation. The results indicate that expressing social closeness with people 
of the same race is not associated with African-American scores on a science knowledge scale. 
However, we provide evidence that favourable ingroup evaluation is positively associated with 
African-Americans’ scores on the same science knowledge scale. 
 






The underrepresentation of Black Americans in STEM occupations, along with racial 
differences in educational experiences, lower levels of general literacy and restricted access to 
scientific information have been posited as important factors associated with racial disparities 
in knowledge about science (e.g. Anderson 2015). Indeed, reports show that the share of Black 
Americans working in the field of science, technology, and engineering has been low at least 
since 1970, and continues to be so now (Landivar 2013). Blacks are less likely to select STEM 
majors at college and they have higher chances of dropping out (Griffith 2010; Chen 2009). In 
terms of schooling, Blacks’ overall experience also tends to be less positive than that of whites 
(for a review see Kao and Thompson 2003; see also Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Lynn and Parker 
2006). Concomitantly, levels of basic and health literacy for Blacks are lower than for other 
race and ethnic groups (NASEM 2016: Chapter 3; Kutner et al. 2006; Rikard et al. 2016). It 
would be unsurprising, then, if science literacy followed the same pattern, plausibly also 
dependent on this common set of structural features. 
Recent research suggests, however, that the racial cleavage in science knowledge is not only a 
mere reflection of broader patterns of social and economic disadvantage. Racial disparities in 
science knowledge persist even when people with the same educational levels are compared 
(Funk and Goo 2015: 5; NSB 2018: 41-43). Adjusting for basic or ‘foundational’ literacy and 
a range of other covariates, Allum et al (2018) found that a substantial knowledge gap remains. 
This indicates that there may be something more at play than observably structural explanations 
for disparities in science knowledge. As Anderson (2015) notes, there arguably exists an 
historically-established “complex relationship between science and the African-American 
community”. Blacks tend to be more anti-scientific in their attitudes (Gauchat 2008) and have 
a lower level of trust in science (Gauchat 2011; 2012). They also consider scientific misconduct 
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to be a bigger issue compared to whites, and this is especially so in the medical realm (Funk et 
al. 2019). 
All of this is unsurprising: the legacy of ‘scientific racism’, as Plutzer puts it (2013: 147; see 
also Fairchild 1991; Williams 1974) is strong and may well drive some of the ways in which 
African-Americans perceive science. Apparent cases of science-driven discrimination (Dennis 
1995) such as Galton’s early work on eugenics (1892) and Jensen’s research on race-based 
differences in IQ, published in 1969, attracted widespread media attention (Sowell 1973) and 
remains one of the most controversial scientific episodes of the 20th century. This and other 
famous cases such as that of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (Fairchild and Bayer 1999; e.g. 
Reverby 2001) could have left a profound imprint on the collective memory of African-
Americans (Assmann and Czaplicka 1995; Halbwachs 1992). This could quite reasonably give 
rise to suspicious - if not downright antagonistic - attitudes to science. This, in turn, could drive 
alienation and institutional distrust, and a lack of motivation to engage with science, including 
with formal and informal science education. 
The perception that science does little for Black Americans is wryly captured in Gil Scott-
Heron’s ironic paean to the space race of the 1960s: “The man jus' upped my rent las' night 
'cause Whitey's on the moon. No hot water, no toilets, no lights. But Whitey's on the moon”. 
For Scott-Heron, the fact that it is white Americans who are on the moon is significant. The 
salience of race in one of the most spectacular scientific achievements of the last century 
derives from the harsh contrast between the deprived material conditions experienced by 
Blacks at the end of the 1960s while seemingly unlimited federal resources were 
simultaneously being channelled to the space race. Thus, it is plausible that race-based social 
identity could be associated with attitudes to and engagement with science, if the social gains 
from science are seen as inequitably distributed along racial dimensions. 
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In the present paper, we take up this theme and adopt a social psychological approach based 
on social identity theory (Tajfel 1974, 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986) along with the related 
idea of stereotype threat (Aronson 2004). In doing so, we seek to elaborate on findings 
emerging from recent research by investigating how the salience of racial-identification and 
ingroup evaluation might be connected with disparities in science literacy. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Social Identity Theory 
The cornerstone concept of social identity theory is, unsurprisingly, social identity. Produced 
by a process of social categorization, which implies systematising the social world according 
to meaningful and distinct categories, social identity describes the state of one’s belonging to 
a certain social group and the meanings that this belonging entails. According to Tajfel, social 
identity is ‘that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his 
membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that group membership’ (Tajfel 1981: 255). 
A subjective interpretation of a group membership is implied by social identity theory and the 
concept of a social group is regarded as flexible as well, being treated as ‘a cognitive entity that 
is meaningful to the subject at a particular point in time’ (Tajfel 1974: 69). Therefore, it should 
not be confused with sociological categories which imply an external, observer-driven 
categorization of social objects (Turner and Reynolds 2001: 137-138). The core mechanism 
implied by the theory, namely, dividing people into ingroup and outgroup, brings about three 
theoretical principles underpinning the dynamics of intergroup behaviour: a) the desire to 
maintain a positive social identity; b) fulfilment of this desire by making a favourable 
comparison with a relevant outgroup c) leaving, or changing the value of the social group, if 
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the social identity provided by it appears to be unsatisfactory (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 16). 
However, not every identity is equally important. The concept of ‘master statuses’ (Jaret and 
Reitzes 1999: 716-717; see Rosenblum and Travis 1996) refers to those substantial 
characteristics (race, gender, class and sexual orientation are examples) that overwhelm other 
identities in structuring social situations. Racial identity is arguably the most pivotal among 
them, since it is rarely possible to mask one’s phenotypical traits that are used by others in a 
process of categorization and thus escape or alter its consequences1. 
While whites’ racial identity is stereotypically associated with being more educated (Allen 
1996) and having higher social status (Saperstein and Penner 2012), Blacks are oftentimes 
subjected to negative prejudices about their behavior and intellectual abilities (e.g. Peffley et 
al. 1997). Even though the awareness of such negative stereotypes could in principle lead to 
enhanced social solidarity, the need constantly to refute unfounded allegations can lead to a 
substantial decrease in well-being (Hughes et al. 2015) and ultimately result in the 
internalization of negative racial stereotypes and a distorted view of oneself and one’s abilities 
(Williams and Mohammed 2013). Our intuition is that science is seen as alienating for at least 
some Black Americans (this is not saying that it may not be alienating for some whites too). 
That being so, it is reasonable to suggest that variation in the salience of racial identity for 
Americans could shape some of the variation in their attitudes and knowledge in relation to 
science. Accordingly, our first research question is: how is the salience of racial self-
identification associated with science literacy for Blacks compared to whites? 
 
 
1 Although racial self-identification might be a subject to fluidity and impermanence (see Telles and Paschel 
2014; Harris and Sim 2002; Mowen and Stansfield 2016), this is more common for those having mixed ancestry 
or multiracial parents, and usually does not affect most of population, whose racial self-identification tends to be 
stable over time. However, see Saperstein and Penner (2012) on how self-classification and categorization by 
others are deeply intertwined with individual’s social status. 
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2.2.2 Racial Divide in the Salience of Racial Self-identification 
There is substantial empirical evidence to suggest that racial self-identification plays an 
essential role in structuring the everyday life of African-Americans and that it is less salient 
among whites. Distinctiveness theory suggests a plausible explanation for this fact, arguing 
that self-identities based on traits that readily distinguish a person from others around them 
tend to be more salient than those that do not (Mehra et al. 1998). Hence, African-Americans 
that make up a visible racial minority are more likely than whites to embrace racial self-
identification as a crucial component of their social identity. This is consistent with findings 
from survey research. Blacks, on average, report feeling closer to the people of their race 
(Williams et al. 2012; Wong and Cho 2005; Wong 1998; Thornton et al. 2012) and are more 
likely to mention race as an identity that is ‘most important to you in describing who you are’ 
(Smith 2007: 388). This feeling of overall closeness translates into the acknowledgment of 
common history and common fate (Bobo and Johnson 2000: 95) which, in turn, gives ground 
for race-based political engagement (e.g. Gurin et al. 1990; Tate 1994). 
Not only do Blacks tend to feel that they are united with other Blacks but this perceived social 
closeness is also intertwined with long-term socioeconomic conditions. Racial disparities 
perpetuate in a host of different ways, for instance in terms of place of living (Emerson et al. 
2001; Iceland and Weinberg 2002), studying (Roscigno 1998; Goldsmith 2009) and strategies 
for finding a job (Mouw 2002). 
Whites, on the contrary, tend to put less emphasis on their racial belonging (Wong and Cho 
2005; Croll 2007). Being a dominant racial identity in the US, whiteness serves as the 
‘unmarked norm against which other identities are marked and racialized’ (Rasmussen et al. 
2001). While being barely noticeable to whites themselves, white racial self-identification can 
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be an object of aspiration and is linked with the achievement of higher social status (Sapperstein 
and Penner 2012; Telles and Paschel 2014). 
In this way, given that the racial identity is more prominent among Blacks than among whites, 
and recognising that the premises for science alienation could be entrenched in Black racial 
self-identification, we hypothesize that, for Black Americans, stronger racial self-
identification will be associated with lower levels of civic scientific literacy. (Hypothesis A). 
 
2.2.3 Ingroup Evaluation 
Our second research question focuses more specifically on ingroup evaluation as a vital part of 
the self-identification process and asks how ingroup evaluation is associated with science 
literacy for Blacks compared to how it is associated for whites. We explain the rationale for 
asking this question in what follows. 
Retaining a positive social identity is an important task for an individual, and there are several 
options for doing so, according to social identity theory. The most common way is to make a 
favorable comparison with a relevant outgroup. One can also abandon a social group that has 
a lower status (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Ellemers and Haslam 2011). Since changing one’s 
racial identity is quite problematic because of the hardly-permeable borders dividing racial 
identities (Hughes et al. 2015: 28), emphasising the distinctiveness of one’s own racial group 
and amplifying its advantages over the outgroup can become a common practice to maintain a 
positive identity for members of devalued groups. 
This social mechanism of raising collective self-esteem (Crocker and Luhtanen 1990) that 
manifests itself in accentuating one’s distinctiveness e.g. by celebrating race-specific cultural 
heritage (Tajfel 1974: 83) is likely especially vital for Black Americans: as their self-
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identification is very much based upon repelling identity-threatening stereotypes. Allport noted 
that African Americans ‘‘have heard so frequently that they are lazy, ignorant, dirty, and 
superstitious that they may half believe the accusations, and since the traits are commonly 
despised… some degree of in-group hate seems almost inevitable’’ (1954: 152, cited by 
Burkley and Blanton 2009: 287). Whilst this was in the context of the Jim Crow America of 
the 1950s, there is little reason to think that things have changed radically in the intervening 
years. 
Positive ingroup evaluation and even ingroup bias, as a radical form of favourable ingroup 
comparison (Rudman et al. 2002; Kiecolt and Hughes 2017), does not imply that Blacks should 
necessarily endorse a positive cultural notion of science per se, but it could nevertheless serve 
as a ground for resisting a stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is a widely studied socio-
psychological phenomenon that provides insight into how self-identification interacting with 
commonly held stereotypes might influence one’s actions and worsen performance in the area 
which is subject to the stereotyping (Steele 1997; Aronson 2004). Social-psychological 
experiments (e.g. Steele and Aronson 1995) have shown that African-American students 
underperform considerably compared to whites in a verbal test when it is framed as a test of 
abilities, rather than one exploring general psychological factors. Presumably, the need to 
confront negative societal stereotypes about their intellectual abilities is what puts on them ‘an 
extra cognitive and emotional burden not borne by people for whom the stereotype does not 
apply’ (Aronson et al. 2002: 114) resulting in more stress and weakened performance. Salient 
racial self-identification, in this regard, can play the role of catalyst making African-Americans 
to internalize more deeply the negative racial stereotypes (Armenta 2010; e.g. Shih et al. 1999). 
In contradistinction to this tendency, those that hold positive outlooks about members of their 
racial in-group will be more likely to question and resist racial intelligence stereotypes. This in 
turn may mitigate their negative effect on performance (Aronson et al. 2002). Thus, treating a 
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positive ingroup evaluation as a signal that the individual’s level of ‘inferior anxiety’ (Steele 
and Aronson 1995: 797-798) is reduced and that they are less subjected to, or at least affected 
by, a stereotypical notion of intellectual capacities throughout the life course, we expect to see 
that for Black Americans, higher levels of positive ingroup evaluation will be associated with 
higher levels of civic scientific literacy (Hypothesis B). 
 
2.3 Data, Measures and Analytical Strategy 
2.3.1 Data 
Data for this study come from the General Social Survey (GSS), which is a biennial, face-to-
face probability survey of the adult population of the US covering a wide range of social and 
political attitudes and beliefs, including racial identity. The GSS has also featured measures of 
science literacy since 2006. The variables required for our analysis are only found together in 
the same questionnaire version in three of the survey years available (2008, 2010, 2016, see 
Appendix 1). We, therefore, combine respondents from all of them into one dataset. In doing 
so, we depart from the assumption that when dealing with such fundamental socio-
psychological attribute as racial self-identification, the time effect of 8 years (2008-2016) could 
be neglected as it is too short to drive profound macro-level changes in how entire nation 
perceives their racial identity. Likewise, looking at the time effects from the perspective of 
racial disparities in science literacy, while the research on adult population is sparse, studies 
conducted among students suggest that the science test score gap between whites and Blacks 
tends to be stable over time (Quinn and Cooc 2015). 
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The response rates the GSS survey waves were 70.4% and 70.3% in 2008 and 2010, 
respectively, and 61.3% in 20162. Survey weights were applied in the regression modelling to 
account for an equal-probability multi-stage cluster sampling design of the GSS. 
 
2.3.2 Measures 
Following the literature on civic scientific literacy (Miller 1987; 1998; 2010; 2016; Allum et 
al. 2008), science literacy was measured as a number of correct (‘True’ or ‘False’) answers to 
a set of 14 quiz-type questions examining respondents’ knowledge of basic scientific facts, the 
idea of probability and the principles of experimental research (see also Gauchat 2012; Allum 
et al. 2018). ‘Don’t know’ and refusals were treated as wrong answers. The list of items used 
to comprise this variable along with correct responses is presented in Appendix 2. 
Respondents’ race was measured with a dummy variable, indicating whether a person is white 
or Black. In this question, the interviewer was asked to code respondent’s race silently and ask 
a direct question only in the case of doubt. Those who fell into the category of ‘other race’ were 
omitted from the analysis because the heterogeneity within this category makes it impossible 
to capture the salience of a specific racial identity.3 
Racial self-identification and ingroup evaluation were measured in a variety of ways (for a 
review see Wong and Cho 2005: 703). In our case we use five items included in the GSS to 
capture how strongly one associates oneself with one’s race ingroup and how one evaluates the 
 
2 http://gss.norc.org/Documents/other/Response%20rates.pdf 
3 Another way to ask about a race in a survey is to refer to respondent’s self-categorization. In General Social 
Survey (GSS), this option is provided by a variable racecen1, which counts a first mention on the following 
question: “What is your race? Indicate one or more races that you consider yourself to be.” While studies report 
that the gap between how interviewer and oneself can see oneself’s racial belonging can exist (Saperstein and 
Penner 2014), this is not the case in the present analysis. Crosstabulation shows that 99% of whites or Blacks 
identified as such by an interviewer considered themselves as whites or Blacks respectively when asked about 
their racial self-categorization. 
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members of the ingroup. Item wordings, response scales, and some examples of previous use 
of these items, are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 14. Measures of racial self-identification and ingroup evaluation 
Question wording Scale Some examples of usage 
In general, how close do you feel to 
Blacks/whites? (close) 
1 (Not at all close) - 
9 (Very close) 
Hughes and Tuch (2003) as 
a measure of social 
distance 
Kiecolt et al. (2017) as an 
indicator of racial self-
identification 
What about having a close relative marry a 
Black/white person? (mar) 
1 (Strongly oppose) 
- 5 (Strongly 
favour) 
St. Jean (1998); Djamba 
and Kimuna (2014) as an 
attitude to marriage outside 
own race. 
Barkan and Cohn (1994) as 
a measure of racial 
prejudice 
What about living in a neighborhood where 
half of your neighbors were Blacks/whites? 
(live) 
1 (Strongly oppose) 
- 5 (Strongly 
favour) 
Weaver (2008) as a 
measure of social distance 
Barkan and Cohn (1994) as 
a measure of racial 
prejudice 
The second set of characteristics asks if people 
in the group tend to be hardworking or if they 
tend to be lazy. Where would you rate 
Blacks/whites in general on this scale? (work) 
 
1 (Lazy) – 7 
(Hardworking) Kiecolt et al. (2017); 
Hughes et al (2015) as 
measures of racial ingroup 
evaluation Do people in these groups tend to be 
unintelligent or tend to be intelligent? Where 
would you rate Blacks/whites in general on 
this scale? (intl) 




4 In the questionnaire there are ten questions, as each of those items in the table was asked separately of all 
respondents about both Blacks and whites. For the purposes of this analysis, they were recoded and the answers 
in respect of the other race category were discarded. This means that, for each of the five items, Black 
respondents’ answers are about Black people and whites’ answers about whites, in order that they can be 
interpreted as measures of self-identification and ingroup evaluation. 
26 
 
In order to investigate the latent nature of these concepts, an exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted on the 5 standardized items. A two-factor model with oblique rotation (Promax) 
yielded the most comprehensible result (see Appendix 3). The first factor is related to the 
variables touching upon the issue of social distance (interracial marriage and composition of 
neighbourhood), thus indicating the measure of the salience of racial self-identification, while 
the second one is mainly composed of variables exploring capacities (industriousness and 
intelligence) of peer ingroup members, indicating the overall ingroup evaluation. The item 
referring to the general estimation of racial affinity (close) was almost equally explained by 
both factors. Factor score estimates were saved and used as independent variables in further 
analysis. 
We also employ three variables that previously have been suggested as potential confounders 
on science literacy - respondent’s level of education, participation in college science courses, 
and foundational literacy. Level of education is measured by the highest year of school 
completed, yet we acknowledge that this is just a proxy for education level, and better 
operationalization would take into account heterogeneity of quality of education based on 
geographical regions and socioeconomic status of the households. Those having a college 
degree and taking science courses while studying generally tend to be more knowledgeable in 
science (Miller 2010; Plutzer 2013; NSB 2018: 37; Funk and Goo 2015: 4). An examination 
of the relationship between foundational literacy, using the same variable as we do here 
(wordsum, a vocabulary test administered to all GSS respondents) and science knowledge was 
carried out by Allum et al. (2018), who found that the inclusion of foundational literacy 
accounted for part of the covariance between race and science literacy. Hence, we include it in 
our analyses. We also adjust for religiosity, family income, respondent’s age, gender, and 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis, n = 1,300 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Civic scientific 
literacy 
R’s score on a science knowledge quiz 8.81 2.78 1 14 
Black Whether R is Black (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.17  0 1 
Racial self-
identification 
Factor 1 saved scores -0.02 0.75 -2.85 1.51 
Ingroup 
evaluation 
Factor 2 saved scores -0.04 0.66 -2.54 2.08 
College-level 
science courses 
Whether R has taken any college-level science 
courses (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
0.43  0 1 
Education Highest year of school completed 13.78 2.79 0 20 
Female Whether R is female (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.56  0 1 
Age R’s age 47.99 17.05 18 89 
Foundational 
literacy 
Total number of correct answers on a 
Wordsum vocabulary test 
6.15 1.83 0 10 
Church 
attendance 
How often R attends religious services ( 0 = 
Never, 8 = More than once a week) 
3.50 2.80 0 8 
Independent 
Whether R identifies as Independent, 
Independent, near Democrat, or Independent, 
near Republican (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
0.40  0 1 
Republican 
Whether R identifies as not strong or strong 
Republican (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
0.27  0 1 
Family income 
R’s inflation-adjusted family income, 
standardized 
0.01 0.95 -1.13 2.93 
Note: Baseline race is white and those categorized as ‘other’ were omitted from the analysis. Baseline political 
preference is Democrat (not strong or strong), and those affiliating themselves with ‘other party’ were omitted 
from the analysis. The number of observations corresponds to the fully specified regression models (Table 3, 
Models 7 and 8). 
 
2.3.3 Analytical Strategy 
In order to test our hypotheses, we fit a set of multivariate linear regressions with interaction 
terms. The interaction terms of race, with racial self-identification and ingroup evaluation 
respectively, allow us to establish whether the effects of these two variables on science 
knowledge differ for whites and Blacks. We expect that racial self-identification and ingroup 
evaluation have significantly different associations for Blacks than for whites, who, in this 
regard, might be considered as a baseline for a comparison. We begin with models that predict 
science knowledge from the set of control variables and education-related covariates. The 
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purpose here is to assess the magnitude of the racial disparity in science literacy, which is our 
explanandum in the models that follow. We then examine the zero-order relationships between 
the identity variables and science knowledge, without controls and interactions, before 
presenting fully specified models with all covariates included. 
 
2.4 Results 
Table 3 presents parameter estimates for the models outlined above. The first model with 
controls only indicates that Blacks, on average, tend to score almost two points less on the 
science knowledge scale than whites, which is consistent with previous findings (Allum et al. 
2018). Women, non-Democrats, older and more religious people have also, on average, poorer 
science knowledge, while higher family income is associated with higher knowledge. Model 2 
adds covariates that account for the various facets of relevant educational and cognitive 
achievement. Having more years of schooling, undertaking at least some science-related 
college courses, and having a higher level of foundational literacy are all positively related to 
science knowledge. When these variables are accounted for, the association with race 
diminishes by one third, family income drops by more than a half, and the association with 
political affiliation becomes small and insignificant. 
Models 3 and 4 provide the first direct look at our hypotheses. Both interaction terms go in the 
same direction, yet they are not significant at the 5% level. Model 3 shows that for whites, a 
one-unit increase (which is approximately one standard deviation) in the level of racial self-
identification is associated with a -0.502 decrease in civic scientific literacy, while for Blacks 
the interaction term is positive, and the slope therefore becomes almost indistinguishable from 
zero. A similar pattern is recognizable in Model 4. For whites, a one unit increase in the level 
of ingroup evaluation is associated with a -0.646 reduction in science literacy, whereas for 
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Blacks the decrease in literacy is very close to zero for the same 1-unit change in their ingroup 
evaluation. 
Models 5 and 6 build upon the previous models by combining controls with interaction terms. 
This changes the picture somewhat. The same pattern is visible in Model 5 as in Model 3, with 
the coefficients being all attenuated and non-significant. Whites who identify more strongly as 
white, score less well on science knowledge, while for Blacks the effect of racial identification 
approaches zero. However, for racial ingroup evaluation, the effect sizes are greater than in the 
model with no controls. The slope for Blacks is 0.256 (i.e. -0.412 + 0.668) while for whites it 
is again negative (-0.412). 
Models 7 and 8 are full-specification models combining controls, educational variables, and 
interaction terms. While a slight diminution in the magnitude of interaction coefficients 
compared to models 5 and 6 is noticeable, the principal relationships remain the same. 
Whatever the racial discrepancy in the effect of racial self-identification might be, it remains 
insignificant in Model 7, and Model 8 continues to show a negative slope of ingroup evaluation 
for whites and a positive slope for Blacks. 
Figures 1 and 2 correspond to Models 7 and 8 and present the predicted science literacy scores 
for Blacks and whites at various levels of racial self-identification and ingroup evaluation 
respectively. While increasing levels of racial self-identification do not make Blacks score any 
higher on the science scale, higher values of ingroup evaluation are associated with the 
consistent raise of their science literacy scores. This is contrary to whites, for whom higher 
ingroup evaluation leads to the observable decrease in science literacy. 
To summarise, no model has suggested that for Blacks more salient racial self-identification 
might lead to a lower level of civic scientific literacy, which leads us broadly to rejecting 
hypothesis A. In fact, the models of interest (3, 5, 7) point out that the association of racial self-
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identification and science literacy for whites seems to be more negative than for Blacks. 
Regarding hypothesis B, the situation is less ambiguous. None of our models have been able 
to show a higher level of ingroup evaluation associated with poorer knowledge of science for 
Blacks. On the contrary, the more positively the African-Americans evaluate their ingroup, the 
higher tends to be their observed level of science knowledge. We regard hypothesis B, 
therefore, as receiving some support. 
 
















Table 3. Parameter estimates for the models on civic scientific literacy5 
 Civic scientific literacy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Race and 
Controls         
Black -1.905*** -1.283*** -2.048*** -2.065*** -1.687*** -1.694*** -1.366*** -1.365*** 
 (0.116) (0.135) (0.237) (0.238) (0.228) (0.228) (0.241) (0.239) 
Female -0.660*** -0.837***   -0.626*** -0.642*** -0.777*** -0.789*** 
 (0.079) (0.089)   (0.156) (0.157) (0.152) (0.153) 
Age -0.026*** -0.026***   -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Independent -0.212** -0.099   -0.156 -0.152 -0.088 -0.094 
 (0.088) (0.093)   (0.172) (0.169) (0.162) (0.159) 
Republican -0.207* -0.034   0.107 0.070 0.036 0.005 
 (0.110) (0.125)   (0.211) (0.212) (0.192) (0.190) 
Family income 0.682*** 0.184***   0.625*** 0.608*** 0.206*** 0.199*** 
 (0.042) (0.047)   (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
Church 
attendance -0.084
*** -0.099***   -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.098*** -0.099*** 
 (0.015) (0.017)   (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) 
Education-
related         
Education  0.157***     0.181*** 0.180*** 
 
5 The difference in the number of observations per each model is due to the number of ballots available for each combination of variables. A multiple imputation procedure 
was conducted using the R package Amelia (Honaker et al. 2011) to see whether the results of the regression modeling in the full specification models (7, 8) are held when the 
loss in observations caused by missings in controls and educational variables is compensated for. Although the magnitude of the effect varies, it does not change the very 
patterns of the relationships between variables. 
33 
 
 Civic scientific literacy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




 0.714***     0.526*** 0.533*** 
  (0.125)     (0.195) (0.196) 
Foundational 
literacy 
 0.444***     0.427*** 0.428*** 
  (0.025)     (0.047) (0.047) 
Interaction 
terms         
Racial self-
identification 
  -0.502***  -0.391***  -0.225**  
   (0.113)  (0.122)  (0.107)  
Black x Racial 
self-
identification 
  0.388  0.369  0.222  
   (0.280)  (0.292)  (0.277)  
Ingroup 
evaluation 
   -0.646***  -0.412***  -0.238** 




   0.523*  0.668**  0.534** 
    (0.294)  (0.272)  (0.263) 
Constant 11.091*** 6.043*** 9.002*** 9.010*** 10.795*** 10.847*** 5.657*** 5.709*** 
 (0.154) (0.319) (0.086) (0.088) (0.300) (0.303) (0.511) (0.508) 
Observations 6,153 3,720 1,620 1,620 1,421 1,421 1,300 1,300 
34 
 
 Civic scientific literacy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log Likelihood -14,999.790 -8,445.311 -4,007.740 -4,004.421 -3,410.107 -3,410.441 -2,917.731 -2,916.999 
Akaike Inf. 
Crit. 30,015.580 16,912.620 8,023.479 8,016.842 6,840.215 6,840.883 5,861.462 5,859.997 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Design-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. White is a reference category for race. Male is a reference category for gender. 




This research derives its motivation from the idea that racial disparities in scientific literacy 
can be explained by introducing into the analysis the notion that differing attachments to racial 
identity interact with culturally-fashioned and transmitted perceptions of science. While it has 
already been shown that the way race predicts scores on a science knowledge scale is partially 
mediated by factors such as education or foundational literacy (Allum et al. 2018), the present 
study adds to the discussion by showing that how one associates oneself with, and assesses the 
traits of one’s racial ingroup, has different associations with scientific literacy for white and 
Black Americans. While these differential associations cannot account for the overall disparity 
between these groups, they suggest that positive in-group evaluation for Blacks is something 
that is linked to greater science literacy. 
Contrary to our expectations, there is little evidence that the salience of racial identity itself is 
associated with lower scientific literacy amongst Blacks and, on the basis of our analysis at 
least, it cannot be regarded as a plausible explanation for observed disparities between white 
and Black Americans. While it is impossible to deny the historical trace of ‘scientific racism’ 
(Plutzer 2013; Fairchild 1991) affecting the well-being of racial and ethnic minorities in 
America, perhaps one might venture that the narratives perpetuating this malevolent experience 
are not as pronounced within the collective memory of African-Americans as might have been 
expected. 
An alternative explanation might be due to ‘stereotype lift’ (Walton and Cohen 2003) – the 
psychological mechanism which could in theory counterbalance the negative prejudice about 
science among Blacks. For some African-Americans, the stereotypical notion of a Black person 
who cannot be knowledgeable in science to the same degree as a white American might serve 
as a motivation for enhanced test performance (although it is fair to say that a knowledge quiz 
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administered on the door-step is a low stakes test). Resisting the ‘chronic internalization’ 
(Burkley and Blanton 2009: 287) of negative stereotypes about the ingroup and using social 
stigma as a self-protective mechanism (Crocker and Major 1989) could in principle be boosting 
Blacks’ interest in science and facilitating their uptake of scientific knowledge. This is also in 
line with the plentiful research showing that greater salience of racial identity brings more 
awareness about racial discrimination (e.g. Shelton and Sellers 2000; Sellers and Shelton 2003; 
Operario and Fiske 2001), thus prompting people to find ways to bypass such prejudice. This 
idea, however, requires further empirical scrutiny. 
We found support for the idea that favourable ingroup evaluation is associated with higher 
science literacy for Black Americans. The positive evaluation of an ingroup that is generally 
stereotyped as less knowledgeable and intelligent could mean that for some Black Americans 
these stereotypes do not play a defining role in self-perception and in fact defying or ignoring 
these stereotypes through boosting ingroup evaluation can alleviate the burden of stereotype 
threat (Aronson et al. 2002; Armenta 2010) and open the way to more engagement with science 
and concomitantly greater knowledge. The degree to which positive ingroup evaluation among 
minorities encourages engagement with science is an area in which more research could be 
directed. 
Another notable finding, about which we had no firm prior expectations, is that increased 
salience of racial identity and positive ingroup evaluation are both associated with lower 
science literacy for white Americans. While the research on white racial identity suggests that 
it tends to be particularly strong among less educated males (Croll 2007) and flourish in poor 
socio-economic environments (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000), our study suggests that the 
science literacy of whites is negatively associated with their racial identification, even when 
various facets of educational attainment and income level are taken into account. We might 
speculate here that increased identification with the dominant racial group perhaps stands as a 
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proxy for more parochial, less cosmopolitan values. Science is arguably an inherently 
cosmopolitan enterprise and scientific knowledge may sit uneasily with a rather blinkered 
mindset praising one’s belonging to a dominant racial group. This is consistent with Croll’s 
(2007) observation that white racial identity is especially salient among those who reject 
multiculturalism and belief that Unites States is, or should be, a white nation. 
In this paper we were able to leverage high quality survey data to explore the association 
between identity, race and science literacy. However, surveys often provide a broad but shallow 
basis for inference. In the present case, one of the limitations is that the questions on identity 
in the GSS are very general in scope. It is possible that questions tapping identity-salience more 
directly linked to scientific issues may yield different results. For instance, Dawson (2018) 
suggests that marginalised social groups do not express firm lack of interest in science; rather, 
the underlying reasons for their disengagement should be sought in the way in which the 
structure of scientific discourse per se provokes their perceived powerlessness and the feeling 
of inferiority to the present cultural order, ultimately excluding them from crucial science 
practices and limiting their ability to be heard and perhaps to listen too. At all events, there is 
much more to be learned about the basis of disparities in science literacy and an urgent societal 
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2.7 Supplemental material 
2.7.1 Appendix 1 
Ballot distribution of the items of interest, GSS 2006-2016 
Variable/Year 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 
Controls 
sex A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
age A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
partyid A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
coninc A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
attend A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
Civic scientific literacy composites 
hotcore B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
radioact B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
boyorgrl A B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
lasers B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
electron B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
bigbang B C A B C A C B C B C A 
condrift B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
evolved B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
earthsun B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
solarrev B C A B C A B C B C B C A B 
odds1 B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
odds2 B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
expdesgn B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
Education-related 
colsci B C A B C A C B C B C A B 
wordsum A B C A B A B C A B A B A B 
educ A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
Race-related 
race A B C D A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
closeblk A C A C A C A C A C A C 
closewht A C A C A C A C A C A C 
marblk A B A B A B A B A B A B 
marwht A B A B A B A B A B A B 
liveblks A B A B A B A B A B A B 
livewhts A B A B A B A B A B A B 
workblks A B A B A B A B A B A B 
workwhts A B A B A B A B A B A B 
intlblks A B A B A B A B A B A B 
intlwhts A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Note: The information is taken from the General Social Survey Data Explorer available at: 
https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/. The GSS survey year and ballots including all the relevant variables and used 




2.7.2 Appendix 2 
The list of items used to construct a civic scientific literacy scale. 
1. The center of the Earth is very hot. (True) 
2. All radioactivity is man-made. (False) 
3. It is the father's gene that decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl. (True) 
4. Lasers work by focusing sound waves. (False) 
5. Electrons are smaller than atoms. (True) 
6. Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria. (False) 
7. The universe began with a huge explosion. (True) 
8. The continents on which we live have been moving their locations for millions of years 
and will continue to move in the future. (True) 
9. Human beings, as we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals. 
(True) 
10. Does the Earth go around the Sun, or does the Sun go around the Earth? (Earth around 
Sun) 
11. How long does it take for the Earth to go around the Sun: one day, one month, or one 
year? (One year) 
12. Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic makeup means 
that they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an inherited illness. A. Does this 
mean that if their first child has the illness, the next three will not have the illness? (No) 
13. B. Does this mean that each of the couple’s children will have the same risk of suffering 
from the illness? (Yes) 
14. Now, please think about this situation. Two scientists want to know if a certain drug is 
effective against high blood pressure. The first scientist wants to give the drug to one thousand 
people with high blood pressure and see how many of them experience lower blood pressure 
levels. The second scientist wants to give the drug to five hundred people with high blood 
pressure, and not give the drug to another five hundred people with high blood pressure, and 
see how many in both groups experience lower blood pressure levels. Which is the better way 




2.7.3 Appendix 3 
EFA standardized loadings, n = 1,620 
Item Factor 1 Factor2 Communality Uniqueness 
close 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.87 
mar 0.73 -0.10 0.48 0.52 
live 0.44 -0.02 0.19 0.81 
work -0.05 0.55 0.28 0.72 
intl -0.02 0.48 0.22 0.78 
Note: SS loadings: 0.76 (F1) and 0.53 (F2); Total of 26% of the variance is explained by the fit. 59% of them are 
explained by F1, 41% by F2. Correlation of regression scores with factors: 0.76 (F1) and 0.68 (F2). Multiple R2 
of scores with factors: 0.57 (F1) and 0.46 (F2). Factor correlation is 0.48. Please see Table 1 in the main body of 




3. Does Public Support for the Welfare State Translate into 
Support for the Environmental State?: Evidence from the 
European Social Survey 
 
Climate change is a serious global threat and national and supranational measures are needed 
to mitigate its negative effects. Collective approaches to eradicating Beveridge’s ‘five giants’ 
of want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness were established in the immediate post WW2 
period and are known under the name of the welfare state. The idea of the environmental state 
emerged around the 1980s acknowledging the state’s crucial role in mitigating a sixth ‘giant’ 
– environmental risks. This paper adopts the Value-Belief-Norm theory to study the 
relationship between public support for the welfare and environmental state measures. 
Employing Round 8 (2016) data of the European Social Survey and performing structural 
equation modeling the paper shows that climate change belief is the strongest predictor of 
support for the environmental state, while the welfare state support has a significant yet modest 
positive effect. The implications for social policy are discussed. 
 
Keywords: climate change belief; environmental state; welfare state; Value-Belief-Norm 






The scientific consensus on climate change is not at all comforting – climate change is indeed 
happening, is mostly caused by human activity, and large-scale collaborative measures are 
necessary to be taken to mitigate its detrimental societal consequences (Giddens 2009, IPCC 
2015, CCC 2015, Royal Society 2010). The need for action is accompanied by the proliferation 
of debates around the ethical foundations of mitigation policies, which focus on the ways to 
overcome a ‘double injustice’ predicament (Gough 2011), curb regressive effects of climate 
change policies (Buchs et al. 2011), and respect overall environmental justice principles 
(Walker 2012). 
While the idea of the state taking measures to prevent global environmental hazards might 
seem as something obscure and distant to the public view, there is one area of government’s 
responsibility that people are already well accustomed to. Alleviating economic burden and 
increasing life chances of the most vulnerable social groups (e.g. elderly, disabled, unemployed 
people) which comes under the name of a welfare state (Beveridge 2000, Espring-Andersen 
2013) is something that seems trivial to the modern world and has been a subject of abundant 
empirical research (e.g. Roosma et al. 2013, Reeskens and Van Oorschot 2013, Van Oorschot 
2006). 
The notion of the environmental state (Meadowcroft 2008, Duit 2016) is similar, yet instead 
of focusing on protecting the well-being of people in need, it emphasizes the central role that 
the state is to play in reducing collective environmental risks. State’s ability to influence 
collective decision making, respond to distributional conflicts, employ coercive and legal 
power and operate on the supranational level (e.g. by shaping the European Union policy) 
makes it a powerful actor (Duit et al. 2016) whose intervention can be potentially more 
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impactful than bottom-up approaches to climate change management based on the principles 
of ecological citizenship (Dobson 2007). 
However, state efficiency could be constrained by people who possess skeptical views on the 
reality of climate change (Rahmstorf 2004, Hoffman 2011, Lahsen 2013). The risk society 
(Beck 1992) and reflexive modernization (Beck et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001) discourses 
emphasize the increasing role lay public plays in co-producing and legitimizing scientific 
expertise. The attenuation of the deficit model of science communication (Bucchi 2008) has 
led to a situation when scientists and policymakers have to obtain public support before 
implementing new policies or regulations. There is evidence that the local population is capable 
of curtailing environmental projects by expressing their collaborative suspicion and 
disapproval (e.g. Upham and Shackley 2007, Jones and Eiser 2009). This opposition is viable 
not only with respect to local, not-in-my-backyard (Heiman 1990) type of agenda but could 
also be stretched out to nationwide ‘organization of denial’ (Jacques et al. 2008) if it receives 
a substantial media coverage (Antilla 2005, Carvalho 2007). 
There is voluminous empirical research on factors of climate change acceptance and disbelief 
(e.g. McCright and Dunlap 2011a, McCright and Dunlap 2011b, Poortinga et al. 2011; see 
Hornsey et al. 2016 for a meta-analysis). The general conclusion is that values and concomitant 
political and environmental worldviews predict climate change perception better than 
sociodemographic determinants such as gender, income, or level of education (Hornsey et al. 
2016). This observation sparked the development of the Value-Belief-Norm theory (Stern et 
al. 1999, Stern 2000) as a framework of modeling public environmental belief and 
environmentally significant personal behavior as a function of personal values and worldview 
(e.g. Poortinga et al. 2012). 
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Given that the environmental state might be seen as an extension of the welfare state in which 
the fight against the five ‘giant evils’ of want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness 
(Beveridge 2000) now encompasses a new enemy of global environmental threats, as well as 
acknowledging the crucial role that laypeople play in shaping public policy in the age of risk 
and uncertainty (Beck 1992), I ask: do Europeans who are supportive of the welfare state also 
favor government intervention into the environmental realm? Conceptualizing this question 
within the framework of the Value-Belief-Norm theory and accounting for political orientation 
allows for examining whether the effect of a welfare state support is robust or attenuated by 
other factors that are commonly related to the environmental state support. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 What is the Environmental State? 
The idea of the government taking a leading part in resolving environmental issues and 
mitigating the consequences of environmental degradation is known under various names. 
Ecostate (Meadowcroft 2005, 2012), Green state (Dryzek et al. 2003), ecological state 
(Lundqvist 2001), all these concepts are similar to what this paper will further refer to as the 
environmental state, broadly understood as ‘a state that possesses a significant set of 
institutions and practices dedicated to the management of the environment and societal–
environmental interactions’ (Duit et al. 2016). This approach to the eco-management somewhat 
counteracts the notion of ecological citizenship (Dobson 2007, Hayward 2006) that emphasizes 
the bottom-up drive of sustainable development and questions the efficacy of government-
driven measures. 
There is an ongoing discussion as to what constitutes the environmental state and how to rank 
nations according to their environmental performance (e.g. Dryzek et al. 2003, Jahn 2014, Duit 
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2016). The latest classification was introduced by Duit (2016) who attempted to arrange nations 
according to their concern about the environmental issues and came up with four types of 
environmental states – established, emerging, partial, and weak – that reflect the degree to 
which the government utilizes its available means – taxation, knowledge generation, policy 
implementation - to improve the ecological situation. What prevents researchers from coming 
up with one universal classification is the crucial role that national and historical contexts play 
in shaping the environmental state in different countries, thus making it more challenging to 
distill universally comparable indicators of the state performance in this area (Meadowcroft 
2008, p. 331-332). However, as Meadowcroft puts it, the very idea of ecological management 
could not be conceived without the prior recognition of the environmental domain as a potential 
area of state’s responsibility, and its acknowledgement as one of the key areas of political 
contention (2012). 
 
3.2.2 The Relationship Between the Welfare and the Environmental States 
It is commonly accepted in the literature on the history of the environmental state that its 
evolution has been heavily influenced by the course of the welfare state development (e.g. 
Gough 2016). Hereinafter, I use a common understanding of the welfare state as a state which 
decommodifies (Rice 2013, p. 94, Esping-Andersen 2013) social risks and promotes social and 
economic wellbeing of its citizens. 
In a global sense, the development of both welfare and environmental states serve as the 
response to the challenges brought about by the forces of ‘industrialization, urbanization and 
democratization’ (Gough et al. 2008) that could not be coped with adequately by the market, 
voluntary actions or local authorities (Duit et al. 2016, p. 9, Meadowcroft 2005). Both welfare 
and environmental states can be considered as an extension of the government to the areas that 
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were previously unregulated by the central authority. State intervention into both domains of 
societal and environmental protection involves balancing between the implementation of new 
rules to the market and operating within economic and political constraints; both ideas of the 
welfare and environmental states are deeply immersed into the discussion of their normative 
nature and are substantiated by the reasoning of social justice and equality (Meadowcroft 2005, 
p. 4-8). 
Although the parallel trends in the development of these two social systems could hardly be 
refuted, there are still considerable differences that set welfare and environmental states apart 
and provoke their separate analysis. Global environmental concerns raise supranational 
challenges that require collaborative actions and could be barely influenced by the effort of a 
single country or region; they presume a greater level of uncertainty and unpredictability of the 
aftermath, putting at a hypothetical risk the entire humankind. The environmental state is also 
characterized by the preference of the regulatory measures over the fiscal ones in the way it 
approaches its challenges, and there is a crucial role that scientists and scientific expertise play 
in measuring, defining, and modeling environmental threats and proposing possible solutions 
for its taming (Gough 2016). In contrast, the rise of the welfare state primarily served as a 
response to the domestic challenges that were less complex in their nature; they were curbed 
mostly by the fiscal strategies and had almost no scientific expertise in the core of their analysis. 
Contemplation over the similarities and divergences in the historical development of these two 
institutional mechanisms has led to the question of whether the properties of the environmental 
state are more likely to be observed in already well-established welfare states compared to 
other socio-political systems. Koch and Fritz (2014) empirically tested this tentative 
assumption which received a name of a ‘synergy hypothesis’ – the proposition that social-
democratic welfare states are more likely to embrace the attributes of the environmental state 
than liberal market economies (Koch and Fritz 2014, p. 680; Dryzek et al. 2003). However, 
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they concluded that the ‘welfare development is largely unrelated to ecological development, 
and social-democratic countries do not perform better in terms of ecology than liberal ones’ 
(Koch and Fritz 2014, p. 695-696). 
To sum up, two perspectives are plausible when thinking about the relationship between public 
support for the welfare and environmental state. One of them would suggest that, given that 
both welfare and environmental states presume and legitimize a central role of the government 
in taking care of its citizens and protecting them from various risks and hazards, as well as 
taking into consideration the temporal precedence of the welfare state over the environmental 
one that might influence public thinking, I suggest the following hypothesis: people expressing 
higher support for the welfare state would also express higher support for the environmental 
state (H1a). 
However, bearing in mind the ultimate differences between the kind of challenges that welfare 
and environmental states are designed to tackle and presuming the predicament that laypeople 
might find themselves in when trying to comprehend the long-term effects of the environmental 
change and calculate their risks, it might also be that people supporting the welfare state would 
express lower support for the environmental state, or that there would be no statistically 
significant relationship (H1b). 
The next section introduces the Value-Belief-Norm theory and dwells on the role that values, 
environmental beliefs, and concerns play in shaping public views on the environmental 






3.2.3 The Value-Belief-Norm Theory 
The V-B-N theory (Stern 2000, Stern et al. 1999, Stern et al. 1995a) is a framework for studying 
factors of environmentally significant individual behavior, whether in a form of pro-
environmental political activism, eco-friendly consumption practiсes, or other. This theory 
posits that there is a top-down causal effect ladder from individual values and ecological 
worldview down to personal pro-environmental norms and pro-environmental behavior, with 
the mediation of perceived beliefs about the adversity of consequences and personal ability to 
reduce environmental threat. 
There is evidence of a fruitful application of the V-B-N theory to the studies of willingness to 
pay for the park conservation (Lopez-Mosquera and Sanchez 2012), choosing an eco-friendly 
car (De Groot and Steg 2010), or accepting several supply- and demand-side measures of 
reducing negative environmental effect (Poortinga et al. 2012). An attempt has been made to 
extend this framework to a cross-national perspective (Oreg and Katz-Gerro 2006). 
While in its initial form, the V-B-N theory implements the division between egoistic, altruistic, 
and biospheric values6 (Stern and Dietz 1994), in this study I use the value classification 
proposed by Schwartz and colleagues. Schwartz considers values to be ‘desirable 
transsituational goals varying in importance, which serve as a guiding principle in the life of a 
person or other social entity’ (Schwartz 1992, p. 21). There are two main value dimensions in 
Schwartz’s theory: Openness to change vs. Conservation and Self-enhancement vs. Self-
transcendence (Cieciuch et al. 2014, Schwartz et al. 2012). While the first opposition roughly 
contrasts desire for change with desire for preserving the status quo and is less relevant for the 
goals of the present research, the latter pair counterpoises concern about personal wellbeing 
 
6 Although this typology of values differs from that of Schwartz’s and colleagues, there is quite a bit of 
assurance that they overlap considerably, with self-transcendence incorporating altruistic and biospheric views, 
and self-enhancement resonating with egoistic ones (Schultz and Zelezny 1999, Stern et al. 1995b, p. 1630). 
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with that of others and nature, thus tapping precisely into the discourse on environmental 
protection. 
There is an ample body of evidence to claim that holders of self-transcendence value 
orientation are more environmentally cautious in their beliefs, behavior, and worldview. Karp’s 
early research (1996) showed that self-transcendence is positively related to a wide array of 
environment-friendly consumer and political types of behavior; Schultz and Zelezny (1999) 
reported that self-transcendence predicts ecocentric rather than anthropocentric concern. 
Furthermore, the environmental quality value which echoes the domain of self-transcendence 
is positively associated with environmental concern, support for the governmental intervention 
into environmental problems, and acceptability of some energy-saving measures. (Poortinga et 
al. 2004). 
Drawing on the Value-Belief-Norm theory, I expect to see that self-transcendence will be 
positively linked to the belief in climate change (H2a). Moreover, treating the very belief in the 
reality of climate change as a manifestation of the ecological worldview, climate change belief 
will be positively related to climate change concern (H2b), and both climate change belief 
(H2c) and climate change concern (H2d) will be positively related to public support for the 
environmental state. 
 
3.2.4 Political Orientation and Perceived Role of the State 
Acknowledging the pivotal role that the political leaning plays in defining public perception of 
the government and its responsibilities, I extend the Value-Belief-Norm framework by 
accounting for people’s political orientation. Left political orientation is commonly associated 
with increased support towards the economically insecure social groups, as well as with more 
trust in state capacity to successfully tackle various kinds of societal challenges. In contrast, 
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right-wing ideology, as Jost et al. (2003) suggest, primarily emphasizes the resistance to change 
and acceptance of social inequality (see also Thorisdottir et al. 2007) which has direct 
implications on the perception of the responsibilities that should be within the scope of the 
government. Baslevent and Kirmanoglu’s (2011) study reports that supporters of the right-wing 
parties were more skeptical of various welfare schemes, even when values and other 
sociodemographic variables were accounted for. Moreover, a paper by Piuorko et al. (2011) 
revealed that at least in liberal democracies left orientation is related to self-transcendence, 
while the right views are more supported by those endorsing self-enhancement value 
orientation. Building upon this, I expect that self-transcendence will be negatively associated 
with the right political orientation (H3a) and that the right political orientation will be 
negatively associated with public support for welfare (H3b) and environmental (H3c) states. 
 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
3.3.1 Data 
Data for this paper comes from the European Social Survey (ESS 2018) which is a biennial 
cross-national survey held across European countries and its satellites. The survey employs 
probability-based sampling and aims for a representative population of each country aged 15 
or more. This study uses Round 8 of the ESS which was conducted during 2016 in 23 countries. 
The core section of the survey on human values combined with rotating sections on welfare 
attitudes and public attitudes to climate change provide the proper ground for testing the 






Public support for the environmental state. This measure was constructed out of three 
questions on public acceptance of various policies aimed at tackling the consequences of 
climate change (see Table 1 for question wordings). The policies consist of increasing taxes on 
fossil fuels, using tax money to support renewable energy sources, and implementing 
legislation against the commercial distribution of energy inefficient household appliances. 
People responded using a 5-point scale ranging from ‘Strongly in favor’ to ‘Strongly against’. 
The coding was reversed so that the higher values of the created latent construct reflect higher 
levels of support for the environmental state. 
Climate change belief. Three items were used to measure three dimensions of climate change 
belief. The reality measure asked on the 4-point scale whether the respondent believes that 
climate is changing at all. The initial answer coding from ‘Definitely changing’ to ‘Definitely 
not changing’ was reversed so that the higher values reflect the belief in the existence of climate 
change. The cause measure asked people to contemplate about the roots of climate change and 
choose between natural and human-driven causes. Finally, the impact measure asked 
respondents to evaluate the possible aftermath of climate change on society (11-point scale, 
from ‘Extremely good’ to ‘Extremely bad’). The latent factor was created out of these 
variables, and its higher scores reflect more critical beliefs about climate change and its 
repercussions. 
These or similar questions commonly constitute the core of the opinion polls on climate change 
(see Capstick et al. 2015 for the systematic review; see also Leiserowitz et al. 2017) broadly 
tapping into the notion of climate skepticism (Rahmstorf 2004, Poortinga et al. 2011, Hoffman 
2011, Lahsen 2013). 
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Climate change concern. The level of concern about climate change was measured with the 
direct question ‘How worried are you about climate change?’. Participants were asked to 
respond using the 5-point scale from ‘Not at all worried’ to ‘Extremely worried’. Unlike the 
questions on the belief that tap into the cognitive perception of climate change, this measure 
aims at reflecting the degree of personal importance attached to climate change and thus can 
be considered as an indicator of the broader environmental concern (Steg et al. 2011). 
Public support for the welfare state. Following the ESS module proposal, this study treats 
public support for the welfare state as a latent factor that was constructed out of three items 
asking the respondents to assess on the 11-point scale the responsibility of the government to 
ensure a reasonable standard of living for such economically insecure social groups as elderly 
people and unemployed, as well as to provide child care services for employees with children. 
The obtained factor captures the broad scope of governmental responsibilities (Roosma et al. 
2014) and provides a generalized measure of public attitude towards them. Lower values of the 
factor indicate less support for the welfare state, higher values – more support. The employed 
indicators are regularly used in studies of social policy (e.g. Emery 2012, Baslevent and 
Kirmanoglu 2011, Calzada and Del Pino 2011) and are said to be robust in terms of their cross-
national measurement equivalence (Roosma et al. 2013). 
Self-enhancement and self-transcendence value orientations. ESS measures personal value 
orientations with the modified version of the Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al. 
2001) which is an adapted variant of the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz 1992, Schwartz 
and Boehnke 2004, Lindeman and Verkasalo 2005) and is designed to be used in surveys of 
the general population. PVQ attempts to make the value questionnaire less cognitively 
demanding so it does not cause difficulties to fill in for people having no schooling. It provides 
respondents with a set of verbal portraits and asks them to relate themselves with the described 
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person on the 6-point scale (from ‘Very much like me’ to ‘Not like me at all’). The coding of 
the items was reversed so that higher values represent more agreement with the proposed trait. 
The ESS Portrait Value Questionnaire consists of 21 items that are meant to represent 10 values 
– power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
tradition, conformity, and security (Schwartz 2003, p. 267-268). These values form two 
orthogonal dimensions – Self-enhancement vs. Self-transcendence and Openness to change vs. 
Conservatism – that capture broader value orientations (Schwartz 2003, p. 269-270). This study 
ignores the latter dimension as it is less relevant in the context of the environmental issues and 
focuses on the effects of Self-enhancement and Self-transcendence as these concepts strongly 
resonate with the values that were initially implemented in the Value-Belief-Norm theory 
(Schultz and Zelezny 1999, Stern et al. 1995b, p. 1630). Five items constitute the self-
transcendence value orientation, and four items form the self-enhancement value orientation7 
(see Table 1). Higher scores on the created constructs represent its greater weight in the 
psychological portrait of the person. 
Political orientation. The following question: ‘In politics, people sometimes talk of “left” and 
“right”. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left 
and 10 means the right?’ was used to assess the political leaning of the respondents. This 
measure has a rich tradition of operationalizing political views in the opinion polls (Barnes 
1971, Klingemann 1972) and there is evidence showing that individual left-right self-
identification tends to be stable over time (Sears and Funk 1999). The 11-point answer scale 
 
7 For the sake of model parsimony and since the ‘lower-order’ values (i.e., Benevolence and Universalism for 
Self-transcendence, and Power and Achievement for Self-enhancement) are beyond the scope of this paper they 
are omitted with manifest variables loading directly on the ‘higher-order’ value orientations. In the ESS PVQ, 
the value of Hedonism which is usually attributed to Self-enhancement is treated as a part of the Openness-to-
Change value orientation and therefore is not included in the analysis (Schwartz 2003, p. 311). 
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implemented in the ESS is considered to be the most valid response format for this question 
(Kroh 2007). 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
As a first step, the descriptive statistics of the observed items were drawn, and the measurement 
model with 5 latent variables – public support for the environmental state, public support for 
the welfare state, climate change belief, self-enhancement, and self - transcendence – was 
carried out to inspect the loadings of the observed indicators on the latent variables (see Tables 
1 and 2). The Expected Parameter Change values (EPC) of the measurement model were 
considered to account for the substantial misspecifications brought by the absence of 
parameters in the model. Following the guidelines by Saris et al. (2009, p. 570) the parameters 
with EPC > |0.2| were added to the model to improve fit, that is the covariances between WEL1 
and WEL2 (std. EPC .339), WEL1 and WEL3 (-.204), and V2 as an indicator of Self-
transcendence (-.277). 
After that, the structural model was fit with public support for the environmental state being 
explained by political orientation, climate change belief, public support for the welfare state, 
and climate change concern. Other paths required by the hypotheses were also defined – see 
Figure 1 for a full path diagram. The standardized coefficients were derived and compared, and 




Table 1. Wordings, Standardized Factor Loadings and R2 of the Observed Items in the Measurement Model (n = 44368; FIMLa) 





Public support for the environmental state   
[…] To what extent are you in favour or against the following policies in [country] to reduce climate change?   
Increasing taxes on fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal. (ENV1) .395c .156 
Using public money to subsidise renewable energy such as wind and solar power. (ENV2) .591 .349 
A law banning the sale of the least energy efficient household appliances. (ENV3) .519 .269 
Climate change belief   
Do you think the world’s climate is changing? (CCB1) .573c .328 
Do you think that climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both? (CCB2)d .490 .240 
How good or bad do you think the impact of climate change will be on people across the world? (CCB3) .542 .294 
Public support for the welfare state   
[…] For each of the tasks I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have.   
Ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old. (WEL1) .687c .471 
Ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed. (WEL2) .491 .241 
Ensure sufficient child care services for working parents. (WEL3) .735 .540 
Self-enhancement value orientation   
[…] Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.   
It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does. (V4) .714c .509 
Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognise his achievements. (V13) .761 .579 
It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things. (V2)e .624 .374 
It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says. (V17) .558 .311 
Self-transcendence value orientation   
[…] Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you.   
It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being. (V12) .700c .490 
It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote153 himself to people close to him. (V18) .663 .440 
He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. (V3) .557 .310 
It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them. (V8) .603 .364 
He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him. (V19) .549 .301 
Note: Question wordings are taken from the ESS Round 8 questionnaire available at: 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/fieldwork/source/ESS8_source_questionnaires.pdf 
All loadings are significant at p < .01 
a Full Information Maximum Likelihood missing treatment. 
b The completely standardized solution is presented, where both latent and observed variables are standardized. 
c The unstandardized parameters of these factor loadings are fixed to 1 to define the scale of the corresponding latent variable. 
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d 5-point answer scale with the following categories: ‘Entirely by natural processes’, ‘Mainly by natural processes’, ‘About equally by natural processes and human activity’, 
‘Mainly by human activity’, ‘Entirely by human activity’. 





The listwise omission of observations with missing information would have resulted in 33355 
cases out of 44387 being used (~25% decrease), so the full information maximum likelihood 
estimation (FIML) approach to missing treatment (Enders and Bandalos 2001) was 
implemented throughout the analysis as it utilizes all available data in the estimation of the 
model parameters. 
While acknowledging the multilevel structure of data (people nested within countries), I 
deliberately focus on reporting the single-level model, as the multilevel framework does not 
seem to add value to the results of the analysis (see Supplementary Materials for discussion). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables in the Analysis 
Item Mean SD Min Max ICC 
Public support for the environmental state      
ENV1 (1 = Strongly against, 5 = Strongly in favour) 2.77 1.23 1 5 0.055 
ENV2  3.94 1.07 1 5 0.57 
ENV3  3.53 1.17 1 5 0.035 
Public support for the welfare state      
WEL1 (0 = Should not be government’s responsibility at all, 10 
= Should be entirely government’s responsibility) 8.17 1.82 0 10 0.066 
WEL2  6.73 2.27 0 10 0.059 
WEL3 7.84 2.12 0 10 0.103 
Climate change belief      
CCB1 (1 = Definitely not changing, 4 = Definitely changing) 3.48 0.69 1 4 0.052 
CCB2 (1 = Entirely by natural processes, 5 = Entirely by human 
activity) 3.42 0.8 1 5 0.033 
CCB3 (0 = Extremely good, 10 = Extremely bad) 6.74 2.2 0 10 0.035 
Self-enhancement value orientation      
V4 (1 = Not like me at all, 6 = Very much like me) 3.77 1.4 1 6 0.105 
V13 3.81 1.37 1 6 0.126 
V2 2.89 1.34 1 6 0.137 
V17 3.83 1.37 1 6 0.109 
Self-transcendence value orientation      
V12 (1 = Not like me at all, 6 = Very much like me) 4.8 1.01 1 6 0.069 
V18 5.04 0.95 1 6 0.084 
V3 4.82 1.08 1 6 0.048 
V8 4.62 1.08 1 6 0.068 
V19 4.82 1.05 1 6 0.032 
Other variables 
Political orientation (0 = Left, 10 = Right) 5.16 2.24 0 10 0.026 
Climate change concern (1 = Not at all worried, 5 = 
Extremely worried) 3.01 0.93 1 5 0.062 
Note: SD = standard deviation; ICC = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient. See Table 1 for item wordings. 




3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and the Measurement Model 
On average, Europeans tend to support government policies aimed at promoting social 
wellbeing and curbing environmental risks. Ensuring a reasonable standard of living for elderly 
people (!̅ = 8.17 on the 0-10 scale) and subsidizing renewable energy sources (!̅ = 3.94 on the 
1-5 scale) are the most advocated welfare and environmental state measures respectively. 
People also tend to believe in the reality of climate change and consider its impact to be 
detrimental (see Table 2). 
In the measurement model, all indicators load significantly on the respective latent factors (see 
Table 1). The standardized factor loadings range from .395 (ENV1) to .761 (V13). Overall, it 
is noticeable that the factor loadings for the concepts that have well-established tools for their 
measurement (self-transcendence, self-enhancement, public support for the welfare state) are 
higher than those for newly established latent constructs. Regarding residual variances, the 
picture varies depending on the construct. For instance, while the variation in ENV1 is 
explained little by its respective latent variable (R2 = .156), for Schwartz’s value items the 
portion of accounted variation does not fall below 30.1%. For some items e.g. V4 (R2 = .509) 
and V13 (R2 = .579) more than half of the variation is explained by the latent factor. The 
measurement model fits well with CFI = .958, TLI = .947, RMSEA = .032 (.031 - .033, p = 1), 







3.5.2 The Effect of the Welfare State Support (Hypotheses 1a-1b) 
Figure 1 provides standardized parameter estimates for the structural model. When accounting 
for the effects of other factors, welfare state support has a positive yet relatively modest effect 
on support for the environmental state (.088, p < .01), thus corroborating H1a and rejecting 
H1b. In total, slightly more than a third (R2 = 0.32) of variation in public support for the 
environmental state is accounted for by the model. 
 
3.5.3 The Value-Belief-Norm Path (Hypotheses 2a-2d) 
All the hypotheses derived from the V-B-N theory find their confirmation. Self-transcendence 
has a large standardized positive effect on climate change belief (.405, p < .01, H2a confirmed), 
while self-enhancement shows the opposite effect. Climate change belief strongly predicts 
climate change concern (.665, p < .01, H2b confirmed) and environmental state support (.517, 
p < .01, H2c confirmed). The effect of climate change concern on environmental state support 
is modest yet significant (.047, p < .01, H2d confirmed). Climate change concern is the most 
explained variable in the model with almost half of its variation (R2 = 0.443) being accounted 
for by other variables. 
 
3.5.4 The Role of Political Orientation (Hypotheses 3a-3c) 
In line with the hypotheses, self-transcendence is negatively related to the right political views 
(-.151, p < .01, H3a confirmed), while there is a positive effect of self-enhancement. 
Corroborating H3b and H3c, right political orientation is negatively associated with support 




3.5.5 Model’s Goodness-of-Fit 
Overall, the model represents data well with conventional goodness-of-fit measures surpassing 
the thresholds, although the values decrease slightly compared to the measurement model. CFI 
= .938 and TLI = .926 are above .9, RMSEA = .036 (.035 - .037, p = 1) and SRMR = .036 are 
below .08 indicating the plausibility of the model. The χ2(df = 158) = 9281.6 is significant (p 





Note: Manifest variables are omitted. Rectangles represent single-variable constructs, ellipses – latent constructs. 
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
a Full Information Maximum Likelihood missing treatment. 
b The completely standardized solution is presented, in which both latent and observed variables are standardized. 




This research was driven by the question of whether Europeans who express support for the 
welfare state are also more likely to be supportive of the environmental state. The results 
suggest that when controlling for other covariates, there is a weak positive effect of support for 
the welfare state on support for the environmental state, and two lines of interpretation might 
be put forward in this regard. 
The first somewhat conservative interpretation suggests that given the very modest effect of 
the welfare state support compared to other covariates, it is reasonable to exclude welfare state 
perceptions from the discussion on the environmental state and its public acceptance. From this 
perspective, welfare and environmental states should be treated as separate entities not only 
from the institutional perspective (Meadowcroft 2005, Dryzek et al. 2003) but in the public 
mind as well. While Koch and Fritz’s article (2014) provides empirical evidence for suggesting 
that the green regulation is almost equally likely to be implemented both in welfare and more 
liberal regimes, this paper then extends this argument by saying that there is almost no 
continuity between public views on welfare and environmental regulations. 
The fact that there is only a modest cross-national difference in people’s responses to the items 
forming the concepts of public support for the environmental state and belief in climate change 
reassures this idea by giving ground for treating environmental state and climate change 
perceptions more as a socio-psychological trait that transcends national borders rather than a 
derivative from the type of socio-political regime in which people happen to live. 
The opposite, more embracing interpretation of the results would stress the persistence of the 
effect of the welfare state support even in light of the entire Value-Belief-Norm theory that has 
been conceptualized in this research and is specifically tailored to explain environmentally 
significant behavior. From this perspective, while people’s values and beliefs upon the 
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existence and adversity of climate change account for a larger portion of the variation in their 
support for the environmental state, there is still room to trace the succession between the public 
images of welfare and environmental states. In other words, it suggests that the complex and 
controversial issue of environmental policy development (e.g. Gough 2011) that inevitably 
faces the need to be publicly legitimized could find its way to success not only through 
emphasizing the detrimental consequences of global warming and forcefully imposing the 
ecological identity upon the citizens; it can take a step back and appeal to the etatism-driven 
idea of the state and its functions. Extending the idea of societal protection by incorporating 
the notion of collective environmental risks and stretching the very notion of scientific 
expertise (e.g. Faucheux and Hue 2001) can become those steps that will make people less 
skeptical about the governmental measures that at first sight might be seen as an excessively 
exaggerated response to a remote danger and an arbitrary encroachment upon the principles of 
free-market self-regulation. 
Apart from answering the main question of the research, this paper provides a fruitful 
application of the Value-Belief-Norm theory to the nonactivist environmental behavior (Stern 
2000). Overall, the results of this research fall in line with the V-B-N theory validating this 
theoretical framework not only in explaining eco-friendly consumption practices (Poortinga 
2012, De Groot and Steg 2010) or environmental activism (Stern et al. 1999), but also 
accounting for the government-driven green initiatives. Self-transcendence as the value 
orientation that emphasizes biospheric concern (Schultz and Zelezny 1999) prompts the 
environmental worldview making people believe in the existence of global warming, 
acknowledge its negative societal consequences and express concern about it. The stronger 
effect of climate change belief compared to climate change concern on support for the 
environmental state suggests that it is not enough to be worried about global warming to 
encourage the fight against it; rather it is the cognitive awareness of the issue and its 
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implications that can truly reinforce the development of the environmental state and legitimize 
it in the public sphere. 
Climate change belief, being the strongest predictor of support for the environmental state 
brings about the importance of promoting ecological worldview (Dunlap et al. 2000) among 
laypeople to alleviate the acceptance of the environmental policies. Most likely, future green 
policies will be associated with the price jump on certain types of products (e.g. fuel) and they 
will also require households to change their already established consumption patterns. Both 
consequences might be perceived with a certain degree of resistance and therefore it is 
important for people not only to succumb to the changes in legislation but interiorize them and 
express full rationally justified personal support. 
Political orientation is another factor that affects support for the environmental state when 
values, climate change belief and other variables are considered. In line with prediction, people 
leaning towards the right wing of the political spectrum are more reluctant to accept 
governmental intervention into the environmental realm. While research on the US has shown 
that conservative political views is a prominent characteristic of climate change deniers 
(McCright and Dunlap 2011b), it is still to be discovered to what extent economic and identity-
protective (Kahan et al. 2012) motives fuel European right-wing supporters’ denial of the green 
state. 
Certain limitations of the paper should be acknowledged and might drive further research. First, 
I unintentionally discard from the analysis the small group of people who are most adamant in 
their refusal to believe in the existence of climate change. Due to survey design, the respondents 
who believed that believing that the climate change is definitely not changing (n = 978, ~2% 
of total n) were not asked other climate change related questions and therefore could not be 
included in the empirical model. Further research might focus precisely on this group of radical 
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climate change deniers (Rahmstorf 2004, Hoffman 2011, Lahsen 2013) and explore whether 
their perception of the environmental state is related to their views on the welfare state. If it 
appeared that there is a positive relationship that would open an avenue for convincing these 
people of the need to impose taxes on environmentally unfriendly fuels and ban energy-
inefficient household appliances through accentuating the general responsibility of the 
government to take care of its citizens and to reduce personal and collective societal risks. 
Propagating the features of the environmental state without intervening into the identity of 
climate change skeptics might be especially promising given how unlikely it is for people to 
abandon the core constituent parts of their social identity (Kahan et al. 2012, Kahan 2015) even 
in the presence of solid scientific evidence. 
Secondly, I limit the focus of this paper to one type of environmentally significant behavior, 
namely what is called the nonactivist behavior in the public sphere (Stern 2000). Although 
arguably this type of environmental behavior fits best the idea of the environmental state as it 
brings to the fore public support for the state-driven initiatives, there are other types of behavior 
that are worth inspecting within the proposed framework. For example, it seems intriguing to 
explore whether the perceived efficacy of the welfare state (e.g. Roosma et al. 2014) might be 
related to public readiness to engage in environmental activism – involvement in environmental 
organizations, demonstration attendance, petition signing – and what might be the causal 
mechanisms explaining this relationship (Stern 2000, see also Fielding et al. 2008). 
Lastly, from the methodological point of view, while some of the constructs implemented in 
this paper (e.g. values and public support for the welfare state) are robust in terms of their 
explanatory potential and are extensively used in various studies, others are less reliable. The 
construct of public support for the environmental state although having a great potential to 
become widely used has not yet been implemented in other surveys in the way it is treated in 
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3.8 Supplemental material 
Multilevel SEM 
Implementing a single-level model on the data with nested structure (people within countries) 
might obscure the real parameter estimates by neglecting the country-level differences. The 
multilevel structural modeling can handle nested data by decomposing variable variance into 
within-level and between-level variance, i.e. the one coming from individual-within-country 
and country differences (Heck 2001, Hox 2002, 2013). While this line of argumentation is 
indeed sensible, the reason I focus on pooled sample analysis is low values of intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC) across the implemented manifest variables, as well as the inability 
of basic two-level models to capture country-level differences properly and the convergence 
issues with more complex two-level models. 
The ICC value shows the proportion of variance in a variable which is accounted for by the 
between level and in case of multilevel factor analysis values higher than .10 indicate that it is 
desirable to account for the country-level differences in explaining item variation (e.g. Dedrick 
and Greenbaum 2011, Hox 2002). In this study, the ICC values range from 3.3% to 13.7%, 
with only 5 items exceeding the 10% cut-off (see Table 2 in the main paper). This suggests that 
the multilevel analysis might be redundant as there is no particularly noticeable variability 
across countries. 
However, an attempt has been made to run several multilevel models to see whether they can 
provide any additional insight. Following Hox et al. (2017, p. 300-301), the model with null 
between level (i.e. no defined variance-covariance structure) reports poor goodness-of-fit: CFI 
= 0.6, TLI = .587, RMSEA = .057, SRMRwithin = .046, χ2(df = 368) = 40922.1 (p < .01). The 
model with independent between level (i.e. variances are specified, covariances are fixed to 0) 
reports somewhat better goodness-of-fit: CFI = 0.915, TLI = .907, RMSEA = .027, SRMRwithin 
84 
 
= .044, SRMRbetween = .368, χ2(df = 348) = 8951.9 (p < .01). As Hox puts it, ‘if the 
independence model holds, there is family-level variance, but no substantively interesting 
structural model’ (2017, p. 300). 
The last step in Hox’s algorithm is to inspect the model with saturated between level i.e. by 
estimating the full variance-covariance structure. Another name for this type of multilevel 
setting is a within-cluster model (Stapleton et al. 2016) and it assumes no meaningful 
interpretation for the second level because there are no substantially defined constructs. 
However, the optimizer has not found the solution for this model and it has not converged. 
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4. Public Perception of Scientists: Partisan and Non-partisan 
Thinking 
 
Many studies have focused on public trust in science as an institution, and in scientists 
themselves. The trustworthiness of scientists is often bound up with the messages that they 
convey and the context in which they communicate. However, in the current study, we examine 
how the public perceives scientists based on the attributes of scientists themselves, irrespective 
of their scientific message and its context. Using the online opt-in representative sample of the 
US adults and running a conjoint experiment, we specifically investigate how scientists’ 
attributes such as sex, race/ethnicity, political ideology, place of work, and field of studies 
affect their perceived preferability as a scientific adviser to local government. We find that 
scientists’ party identification appears to be the most prominent factor defining their 
preferability: respondents are prone to partisan bias, preferring scientists who are politically 
congenial, while Democrat respondents also endorse Independent scientists. Moreover, we find 
that the effects of place of work and field of studies on scientists’ preferability are more 
pronounced than the effects of socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. sex and race/ethnicity). 
People tend to prefer scientists affiliated with natural sciences such as physics, medical, and 
environmental science to those in economics, and especially Democrats prefer those working 
in universities rather than industry. Identifying the cognitive shortcuts that people use in 
evaluating scientists can help the wider scientific community foster communication between 










Understanding how citizens perceive and engage with science is becoming a matter of 
increasing concern for public policy. The extant body of research in this field is voluminous, 
but some key themes clearly emerge. Broadly, much of this research has examined civic 
scientific literacy (Miller 2016), attitudes to science (Allum et al. 2008), public engagement in 
science policy-shaping (Mejlgaard and Stares 2013; Makarovs and Achterberg 2018), as well 
as exploring public sentiment around polarizing issues e.g. global warming (Hamilton et al. 
2015) or vaccinations (Larson et al. 2016). However, the central role in this field is assigned to 
the concept of trust in science (Gauchat 2012; Achterberg et al. 2017). Science as a public 
enterprise cannot prosper without public trust. Despite hot-button issues such as global 
warming and, more recently, COVID-19, activating partisan conflicts, the best evidence we 
have shows that overall, the US public expresses a high and stable level of confidence in the 
scientific community compared to other institutions (Krause et al. 2019). 
As abundant as the research is on trust in science as an institution and in scientists themselves, 
fewer studies have examined in detail the attributes of scientists that are likely to make them 
appear more or less trustworthy amongst the public. What we do know is that the majority of 
Americans tend to regard scientists as intelligent, honest, and focused on solving real-world 
problems (Funk and Hefferon 2019), that scientists working for the universities rather than 
government or industry are perceived as more trustworthy (Castell et al. 2014), and that there 
is a gradient of authority related to the specialization within which scientists work (Gauchat 
and Andrews 2018). 
Looking beyond these broad stereotypical perceptions of scientists is necessary in order to 
understand the public opinion dynamics of particular controversies. Scientists play a pivotal 
role in communicating the contents of their research to a wider audience and informing 
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policymakers about the implications of their discoveries (O’Brien 2013). Trust in scientists has 
been found to shape public opinion about scientific controversies (Brewer and Ley 2011), 
mediate how exposure to mass media translates into beliefs about global warming (Hmielowski 
et al. 2014), and it can potentially have a positive effect on public trust in science media 
(Brewer and Ley 2013). 
Despite enjoying a high level of public trust in broad terms, the scientific community can face 
a struggle with signalling the integrity of research to a general audience. One of the reasons for 
this is that the institutionalized instruments that underpin research integrity – e.g. study 
preregistration, funding disclosure, peer-reviewing– that are used to indicate adherence to 
accepted codes of scientific code of conduct are not always transparent and uniformly 
interpreted by general audiences (Jamieson et al. 2019). The other – even more fundamental 
reason – is the perceived social distance between scientists and the public (Bourdieu 1985). 
This divide is reinforced by keeping lay people outside of the dialogue on science policy 
(Stilgoe et al. 2014) and cultivating the image of scientific research as monolithic and not prone 
to any kind of ‘human’ indeterminacy and frailty (Locke 1999). As a consequence, Fiske and 
Dupree (2014) show that as much as scientists are viewed as competent and intelligent, they 
are also perceived as ‘low-warmth’ professionals who are distant from the general public and 
thus oftentimes unable to ignite trustworthiness and convey the credibility of their research. 
This status quo hampers the dissemination and legitimization of scientific outcomes and does 
not facilitate the convergence of opinion between scientists and the public. However, a question 
that has been somewhat overlooked is whether scientists themselves should be treated as a 
homogeneous group or whether public preference for scientists is unequally distributed based 
on their socio-demographic, partisan, and professional characteristics. We aim at addressing 
this gap by studying how the characteristics of scientists themselves contribute to how they are 
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perceived by the public, irrespective of the scientific message conveyed – a message that may 
itself trigger heterogenous reactions that color perceptions of the scientists themselves. 
For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, public perceptions of the chief medical advisor 
Anthony Fauci are doubtlessly influenced by whether his public health messages have 
implications congenial to citizens’ political ideology. 
To accomplish this aim, we run a conjoint experiment that permits us to estimate the relative 
contribution of a set of scientists’ personal attributes to their perceived favorability without 
being confounded by other contextual factors. We present experimental subjects with a 
sequence of paired conjoint profiles asking for their preferences between two potential 
candidates for the role of scientific advisor to local government. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
4.3 Employing Social Identity Theory to Studying Preferences for Scientists 
Social identity theory (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel 1981; Turner and Tajfel, 1986) posits that 
individuals navigate through the social world by categorizing people into groups, namely into 
those to whom they feel closeness and similarity (in-group) and those who are perceived as 
distant and even threatening to them (out-group). One way to maintain a positive social identity 
for an individual is to demean the out-group by stereotyping some qualities of its members in 
an intentionally exaggerated way. Stereotypes, hence, serve as a cognitive shortcut that allows 
people to engage with motivated reasoning –making quick judgements without spending 
cognitive resources on conscious scrutiny (Kahneman 2011). 
In this paper, we examine 5 distinct characteristics of scientists that we believe are the most 
pertinent when it comes to looking at what might trigger people’s judgments about the 
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favorability of scientists and their work that are in principle unrelated to the competences and 
motivations that scientists might bring to their work. These characteristics are sex; 
race/ethnicity; place of work; field of studies; and political identification.  
 
4.3.1 Sex 
Stereotypes concerning sex roles penetrate many aspects of living and are deeply embedded in 
the current social order. A considerable fraction of these stereotypes conveys a denigrating 
message about women and often denies that they possess certain traits that are historically seen 
as owned exclusively by men, such as high-level intellectual abilities (Bian et al. 2017) or 
strong leadership competencies (Hentschel et al. 2019). Moreover, women are still often 
expected to prioritize family and caregiving over professional achievements and to engage with 
household duties more than men (Ellemers 2018). Academia is also subjected to the sex 
disparities (Carli et al. 2016). Men outnumber women in the number of science majors they 
take at college, even though up to high school both sexes enrol in roughly the same number of 
math and science courses (Hill et al. 2010). As a consequence, women tend to be 
underrepresented in science, especially in the STEM field. The latest NSF Indicators report 
suggests that although women constitute 52% of the college-educated workforce in 2018, they 
account for less than a third of all the scientists working in the fields of engineering (16%), 
computer science and mathematics (27%), and physical science (29%) (NSF 2019). With these 
considerations in mind, our first expectation is that women fit the archetypal image of a scientist 
less well and that therefore they will be perceived as less preferable and trustworthy than male 






Another crucial factor that can affect the perception of scientists is their race. People coming 
from minority ethnic backgrounds are often subjected to prejudice regarding their intellectual 
abilities and capacity for work (Pieterse 1992; Bogle 2001). Negative stereotyping has been 
shown to induce stress among African-Americans when they are undertaking tasks framed as 
tests of cognitive abilities (Steele and Aronson 1995). African-American and Hispanic 
populations tend to score lower on science literacy than whites, even when educational 
attainments are accounted for (Allum et al. 2018; NASEM 2016), and they feel more alienated 
from science overall (Plutzer 2013). 
The disparity persists when considering academic employment (Landivar 2013). The latest 
NSF data shows that ethnic minorities make up only between 10% to 22% of the total science 
and engineering workforce in the US in 2018 – most dramatically underrepresented in life 
sciences (10%), physical sciences (11%), and engineering (12%) (NSF 2019). This brings us 
to the hypothesis that Black and Hispanic scientists will be perceived as less preferable and 
trustworthy compared to white (Hypothesis 2.1). 
The opposite set of stereotypes surrounds the identity of Asian Americans. In line with the 
notion of ’model minority’ (Kawai 2005) attributed to Asians, and suggesting a generally 
positive appraisal of this group, Asians are perceived as more industrious, academically 
successful (Chang and Demyan 2007) and nerdy (Zhang 2010) than whites and other 
minorities. They are viewed as more likely to succeed in such intellectually demanding jobs as 
engineering, computer science and mathematics (Leong and Hayes 1990). Hence, we expect 





4.3.3 Place of Work 
Levels of public trust in institutions vary depending on whether they are state, industry or 
academic. Scientists working in these domains may be viewed differently too. NSF data 
highlights that 40% of the US population has a ‘great deal of confidence’ in the scientific 
community in 2016, while half this fraction trusts major companies (18%), organized labor 
(13%), the executive branch of the federal government (13%), and congress (6%) (NSF 2018). 
There is a long debate about the impact of market efficiency and private profits on the integrity 
of the scientific enterprise (Chalmers and Nicol 2004). The opponents of the commercialization 
of research claim that it can lead to widely occurring conflicts of interests, restricted public 
access to the benefits of research and constraints on the circulation of ideas within the broader 
scientific community (Small and Mallon 2007). Privately funded scientists may be motivated 
more by the external (profit) rather than intrinsic (public good, benevolence) factors, thus 
compromising the credibility of their scientific claims (Critchley 2008). 
Scientists working for the governmental research institutes, albeit being less vulnerable to 
accusations of profit-related self-interest, are open to being mistrusted from a different 
perspective. Public confidence in the government has been gradually eroding from the 1960s 
up until now (PEW 2019). One of many potential reasons for this is a growing perception that 
important information is concealed from the public (Rainie and Perrin 2019), leading to the 
emergence of alternative narratives or conspiracy theories e.g. about 9/11 (Wood and Douglas 
2013) or the John F. Kennedy assassination (Swami and Furnham 2014) or more recently 
QAnon (Tollefson 2021). 
Nevertheless, universities, although undergoing democratization and being increasingly 
demanded for transparency, accountability and public participation (Stilgoe et al. 2014, Fuller 
2011), are still regarded as the most credible producers of scientific knowledge as far as the 
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public is concerned. Therefore, we propose the hypotheses that scientists coming from industry 
will be viewed as less preferable and trustworthy (Hypothesis 3.1) and those working for 
universities will be viewed as more preferable and trustworthy (Hypothesis 3.2) than scientists 
working for the government. 
 
4.3.4 Field of studies 
There is a rich scholarship on how scientific disciplines engage in boundary-work (Gieryn 
1983; 1999) to delineate themselves from each other and from non-science, thus legitimizing 
knowledge claims, attracting more resources and gaining influence in the public sphere (Cetina 
2009; Kagan 2009). 
Gauchat and Andrews examined how the public maps sciences according to their ‘cultural 
authority’, that is to say the perceived scientific prestige of the field and the degree of autonomy 
it possesses in relation to the institutions and actors holding political and economic power 
(Gauchat and Andrews 2018, Gauchat 2011). They show that while hard sciences such as 
physics, medicine, and biology tend to score high on the dimension of scientific prestige and 
stay neutral in terms of their autonomy-heteronomy, economics appears to the US public as 
characterized by heteronomy and moreover is not perceived as a very scientific discipline 
(Gauchat and Andrews 2018). 
Some fields are prone to permeation by conspiratorial theories. Contentious topics such as 
vaccination (Kata 2010), infectious diseases (Cohen and Carter 2010), climate change (Douglas 
and Sutton 2015) – and their respective scientific fields (e.g. medical and environmental 
sciences) – are more likely to be contaminated by conspiratorial narratives and undermined as 




Given this, we hypothesize that physicists and those coming from environmental and medical 
sciences will be viewed as more preferable and trustworthy than economists (Hypothesis 4.1), 
and physicists will be viewed as more preferable and trustworthy (Hypothesis 4.2) than those 
coming from environmental and medical sciences. 
 
4.3.5 Partisanship 
Party identification (partyID) could be used as a perceptual screen to quickly identify 
trustworthy actors (Fiske and Dupree, 2014). Relatedly, partyID is known to affect how people 
process information and make inferences from data (Kahan et al. 2017). The idea of motivated 
(Lewandowsky and Oberauer 2016; Chen et al. 1999) or identity- protective (Kahan et al. 2007) 
cognition boils down to the notion that when facing controversial questions that are in principle 
to be processed via objective and unbiased scrutiny, people are rather inclined to shape their 
answers and attitudes in a way that shields their core beliefs and identities from being 
threatened. Thus, if scientists visibly endorse a particular political ideology, people tend to 
apprehend the content of those scientists’ messages differently depending on their own political 
orientation. The ongoing debate on climate change serves as a clear example of motivated 
thinking (McCright and Dunlap 2011). Empirical research shows that increased levels of 
education (Hamilton et al. 2015) and scientific literacy (Kahan et al. 2012) lead to more 
acceptance of climate change among Democrats, yet do not change opinions among 
Republicans. Similar narratives can be found in the discussion on nanotechnologies (Kahan et 
al. 2009) and vaccination behavior (Kahan et al. 2010). 
Building upon this idea, we hypothesize that people will more likely prefer those scientists who 
express the same political stance as they do, e.g. Democrats will more likely prefer those 
scientists who identify as Democrats, and Republicans will more likely prefer Republican 
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scientists (Hypothesis 5.1). Additionally, the effect of partisanship for scientists working for 
the government or universities may differ from that which operates for those working for 
commercial organizations, since scientists working in industry may be perceived as less 
principled and to allow their ideological positions to influence how they present their work 
when there is a conflict of interest. Therefore, we also anticipate that the effect of scientists’ 
partisanship will interact with their place of work (Hypothesis 5.2). 
 
4.4 Materials and Methods 
We adopt a conjoint survey experiment design, which is extensively used in marketing research 
to reveal multidimensional consumer preferences (Green et al. 2001). This survey experimental 
design had little traction in social and political science until Hainmueller, Hopkins, and 
Yamamoto (2014) established a formal model linking the conjoint design to the Neyman-Rubin 
causal model, without invoking strong model assumptions. Following their canonical study, 
conjoint experiments have been designed to study various topics, such as immigration 
preferences (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015); the social construction of illegality (Flores and 
Schachter 2018); attitudes toward asylum seekers (Bansak et al. 2016); and more frequently, 
candidate preferences (Sen 2017, Kirkland and Coppock 2018). Unlike traditional factorial 
survey experiments, conjoint experiments are designed to optimize the capacity to decompose 
the effects of multidimensional traits simultaneously. More precisely, a conjoint design allows 
researchers to disentangle the effects of multiple causal factors on subjects’ preferences, 
choices or ratings over distinct candidates or stimuli through hypothetical scenarios. 
Hainmueller and colleagues argue that conjoint experiments can measure individuals’ choices 
in real-world situations, comparing their experimental estimates to behavioral benchmarks in 
real-world outcomes to ensure external validity. 
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Given the methodological advantages outlined above, we regard the conjoint design to be well 
suited for studying public perceptions of scientists, who are often presented by media to the 
public on the basis of their personal characteristics and professional affiliations. Thus, in our 
conjoint design, we created a scenario where respondents are asked to compare and judge the 
profiles of hypothetical scientists, in five rounds, who vary along multiple dimensions, such as 
sex, race/ethnicity, scientific field, place of work, and in some randomly selected cases, 
political party identification. SI Appendix provides both the details of the scenario and a full 
list of attributes in these dimensions. 
The experiment was designed in Qualtrics and performed in March of 2020 after the study was 
preregistered at https://osf.io/fe2s9 and granted ethical approval at the University of ***** 
(ETH1920-0447), with US adults recruited through Prolific, which provided us with a high 
quality online opt-in representative sample based on age, sex, and ethnicity (Peer et al. 2017). 
SI Appendix provides the demographic characteristics. All questions and question blocks were 
randomly ordered to avoid spillover effects. Following the suggestions of Hainmueller et al. 
(2014), we employed a paired profiles conjoint with forced-choice design (see SI Appendix, 
Fig. S1.), in which two scientist profiles are presented next to each other. The main advantage 
of this design is that it allows respondents to compare two scientists on each attribute 
simultaneously and encourage them to more thoroughly engage with the information about the 
scientists. Additionally, in our design the respondents were also asked to rate both profiles on 
rating scales in order to measure different dimensions of trust for a robustness check (see SI 
Appendix, S7-10.). Research subjects may use cognitive shortcuts in evaluating profiles, for 
instance, over-weighting the first attribute shown to them or some particularly salient attributes. 
Hence, we randomized the order of the attributes for each pair of profiles. Last but not least, 
drawing on the same strategy as adopted by Kirkland and Coppock (2018) and Sen (2017), in 
order to directly test the salience of partisanship and its impact on other attributes, a randomly 
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half of respondents were shown the scientists’ political party identification in the paired profiles 
while the others were not. Our main outcome variable measures research subject’s scientist 
preference, which is asked “Which of these two scientists do you prefer to elect as the member 
of the Board of Scientific Councillors in your district?” In order to reflect on the 
multidimensionality of trust (general trust, epistemic trust, and normative trust), we also 
employ three more outcome variables on 7-point scales (see SI Appendix, Table S3.). In 
analyzing the effects of our experimental manipulations on these four dependent variables, we 
follow an alternative non-parametric estimation strategy as suggested by Hainmuller et al. 
(2014). That is, the causal quantity of interest is called the Average Marginal Component Effect 
(AMCE) rather than the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), which precisely represents how 
much the probability of choosing a scientist profile would change, on average, if one of the 
scientist’s attributes (e.g. scientific field) was changed from one level to another (e.g. from 
economics to physics). The AMCEs can effectively be estimated without bias, using a 
following linear regression model: 
 
where yijk is respondent i’s preferences for scientist j ∈ {1,2} in the kth task (k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}); 
" is an intercept; xijkl is a vector of dummy variables showing that scientist j in the kth task of 
respondent i trusted or mistrusted; #! is a vector of those dummy variables’ coefficients; and 
$ijk represents individual-level idiosyncrasies, an error term. We make the required assumption 
that the errors are independent of each other and of scientist attributes, which is justified by the 
experimental design. Since the respondents are given two profiles to evaluate in five rounds, 
standard errors are clustered by respondent to avoid biased estimates of the variance. We 
separately estimate Equation 1 based on two subsets of sample, in which scientists’ dimension 
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of party identification is randomly added to the list of attributes for some respondents. In 
addition, we condition the estimation on the research subject’s political identification to detect 
heterogeneous treatment effects. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Estimated Average Marginal Component Effects 
We present average marginal component effects (AMCEs), as well as reporting marginal 
means in SI Appendix. First, we separately present the effects of scientists’ attributes for those 
respondents who were randomly selected to receive and not to receive the attribute of scientists’ 
political party identification in the conjoint profiles. Second, we examine how the attribute of 
place of work is moderated by scientist’s political party identification. Third, we report 
conditional AMCEs and marginal means to examine potential heterogeneous treatment effects 
of scientists’ attributes by respondents’ political party identification. Last but not least, we also 
test the effects of scientists’ attributes on the extent to which they are perceived to be 
trustworthy along several dimensions of trust (see SI Appendix, Fig. S8). 
In column one of Fig. 1, the effects of changes in attributes of scientists on the probability of 
preferring for scientists are shown without the party identification attribute whose presence in 
conjoint profiles randomly varies across respondents. The results indicate that respondents 
clearly prefer scientists who are specialized in natural sciences by a margin of 16-31 percentage 
points (SI Appendix, Table. S4.), relative to scientists in economics, corroborating Hypothesis 
4.1. In contrast to our expectation for Hypothesis 4.2, scientists coming from physics are 
favored less compared to those coming from medical and environmental science (SI Appendix, 
Fig. S10.). The results also support Hypothesis 3.2, that respondents are more likely to prefer 
scientists working at universities to scientists working for the government, by a margin of 9 
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percentage points (SI Appendix, Table. S4.). Even though respondents slightly prefer Asian 
American, Black and female scientists relative to white male scientists, these effects are very 
small. (SI Appendix, Fig. S10.). While the finding confirms Hypothesis 2.2, it does not confirm 
that male scientists are perceived more favorably, compared to female scientists (Hypothesis 
1). When we move to subgroup analysis, we find that Republican respondents are more likely 
to prefer male scientists, while Democrats favor female scientists (SI Appendix, Fig. S6. and 
S11). 
 
Fig. 1. Estimated Average Marginal Component Effects. Dots represent point estimates of 
AMCEs, and segments represent their 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered 
at respondent level. 
 
The second column of Fig. 1 shows that, overall, respondents who were exposed to the 
partisanship attribute, are less likely to prefer partisan scientists relative to politically 
independent scientists. We examine heterogeneity in these treatment effects by partisanship 
later. Additionally, once respondents know the political orientation of scientists, the effects of 
scientific field and place of work are attenuated. The last column of Fig. 1 indicates that 
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respondents statistically significantly alter the marginal weight given to the attribute of 
scientific field and place of work if they are shown the attribute of political party identification. 
By contrast, the difference in AMCEs for other attributes is insubstantial. 
Analyzing within-design interactions (SI Appendix, Fig. S9.), we find that the change in 
probability of favoring a scientist working in industry and university, relative to scientists in 
government does not significantly vary depending on scientist’s partisanship in reference to 
the baseline level, in contrast to our expectation in Hypothesis 5.2. 
 
4.5.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Respondent’s Party Identification 
We reproduce our results conditioning on respondent’s own partisanship (SI Appendix, Fig. 
S6. and S11.). If respondents are not exposed to information regarding scientists’ partisanship, 
being Democrat increases the preference for female scientists by 8 percentage points (SI 
Appendix, Table. S5.), while Republicans are 6 percentage points less likely to choose female 
scientists. We also observe that both Republicans and Democrats have a pronounced preference 
for scientists in natural sciences relative to economists, but Democrats substantially favor 
environmental scientists more than Republicans do. Although our main theoretical prediction 
is confirmed -- that respondents prefer scientists working at the universities relative to scientists 
working for the government -- disaggregated results show that this is true only for Democrat 
respondents, not Republican respondents. In addition, while Democrat respondents equally 
favor Democrat and politically independent scientists, Republicans only favor scientists who 
share their political orientation. This finding confirms our Hypothesis 5.1. 
The effects of scientists’ ethnicity/race and place of work also vary between Democrats and 
Republicans. Specifically, while scientists in industry are preferred by Republican respondents, 
Democrat respondents choose scientists at universities over others. Democrats are also 7 and 4 
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percentage points more likely to favor Asian American and Black scientists respectively, 
relative to their white counterparts (SI Appendix, Table. S6.). Both Democrats and Republicans 




In this research, we have examined how the presence of various characteristics of scientists can 
shape public perceptions of them and their preferability for a scientific public advisory role. 
The strength of our research design, using a conjoint analysis, means that we can evaluate the 
effect of these attributes simultaneously. 
Our results show, rather reassuringly, that the scientific field and type of institution in which 
scientists work matters more than their ascribed characteristics of sex, race and ethnicity. Those 
working at universities and in natural and medical sciences are favored over economists and 
those working in industry or government. This broadly aligns with previous survey findings, 
where medical and university scientists are amongst the most trusted (Gauchat and Andrews 
2018). 
Exposure to scientists’ partisan sympathies does not alter the importance of demographic 
features of scientists but is important in weighing the impacts of scientific field and workplace. 
Overall, there is a preference for scientists in a local scientific advisory role to be politically 
neutral. However, we find that when we disaggregate these preferences for Democrat and 
Republican respondents, we find that both groups show a penchant for scientists sharing their 
own party ID, although in the case of Democrats, politically independent scientists are 
marginally preferred. It is noteworthy that political orientation acts as a cue in assessing the 
trustworthiness of scientists despite the fact that in many, if not most, instances, this would 
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have little influence on scientific work. That said, this experiment asks respondents to choose 
a scientific advisor to local government, which arguably is a role more open to the influence of 
politics than basic or applied research. 
Overall, we find that our results tend to support previous research showing that natural and 
medical scientists will find it easier to garner trust than social scientists. Race, ethnicity and 
sex do not appear to act as strongly negative cues, which is contrary to what might have been 
expected. Consistent with the polarized political landscape in the U.S. more generally, 
perceptions of partisanship on the part of scientists seem likely to generate differences in the 
extent to which they are trusted by different groups, rendering consensus on hot scientific topics 
more elusive. 
As for the study's limitations, one of the artifacts of the experimental design that could inflate 
the disparity in the effects of the scientific field is the way scientific disciplines are worded in 
the conjoint profile description. While two of them – medical science and environmental 
science – contain the word ‘science’ in the wording, the other two – physics and economics – 
do not. Having the word ‘science’ in the phrasing of the scientific discipline could have 
triggered the respondents to pick scientists from these disciplines as their overall profile might 
have sounded more professional and relevant to the legend of the experiment, which states that 
the respondents were asked to choose a member of the board of scientific councilors. While 
the significance of this effect cannot be estimated with the present data, further research should 
be more cautious about framing the attribute levels in the conjoint setting, ensuring that all of 
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4.8 Supplemental material 
4.8.1 S1. Survey Experiment and Sample Characteristics 
Our survey experiment was fielded in the United States in March 2020. We recruited 1005 
participants through Prolific Academic, a large online panel with over 40,000 active 
participants. Based on Prolific’s representative quota sampling, Figure S2 shows that our 
sample is fairly representative of the U.S. population in terms of age, sex, and ethnicity. 
Our empirical strategy is based on a conjoint survey experiment. This experimental technique 
allows us to identify individuals’ perception of scientists, simultaneously manipulating 
multiple attributes of scientists through different profiles (Hainmueller et al. 2015). This 
experimental design provides research subjects with paired profiles of scientists, whose 
attributes are randomly varied, to ask their preferences over the profiles. In doing so, we are 
able to identify the causal impact of each attribute of scientists over research subjects’ 
preference for a certain profile. Employing the conjoint experiment, we also aim to better 
unveil attitudes on sensitive questions such as the effect of scientist’s sex or race on public 
preferences, since this experimental design allows respondents to justify any particular 
preference with a number of reasons (Hainmueller et al. 2014). 
In our conjoint design, we created a scenario where respondents are asked to compare and 
judge the profiles of hypothetical scientists, in five rounds, who vary along multiple 
dimensions, such as sex, race/ethnicity, scientific field, place of work, and in some randomly 
selected cases, political party identification. In addition, in our design, respondents also rate 
the profiles of scientists on a scale based on their perceived trustworthiness (see S3). Table S1 
shows the list of attributes and values for scientists used in the conjoint experiment. Figure S1 













4.8.2 S2. Covariate Balance Testing and Carryover Effect Testing 
Table S2 and Figure S3 show that the randomization of receiving partisan prompt in a paired 
profiles conjoint balanced potential confounding factors on average. This ensures the internal 
validity of the between-subjects design by conducting the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Chi-






We also controlled whether our within-subjects design is balanced. In order to ensure that each 
level of attributes is uniformly distributed, we compared a covariate (respondent’s age) across 
different levels of attributes. Confidence intervals of marginal means in Figure S4 show that 




In ensuring the internal validity of within-subjects design in our conjoint experiment, we also 
checked the assumption that respondents do not assess the profiles in subsequent rounds with 
carrying over the effect from one task to another so that multiple observations from the same 
respondent can be treated as independent of one another. Figure S5 shows that there is no 







4.8.3 S3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Respondent’s Party Identification 
The main results show that respondents, on average, are less likely to prefer partisan scientists, 
relative to politically independent scientists. Nonetheless, we are aware that our sample 
distribution is skewed to Democrats as other opt-in online survey panels. This may obscure 
some heterogeneous treatment effects by respondent’s partisanship. Therefore, we also provide 
the results of heterogeneous treatment effects by respondent’s partisanship. As Tables S5, S6, 
S7 and Figure S6 show, while Republicans are more likely to prefer their co-partisan scientists, 
relative to politically independent scientists, Democrats favour less their co-partisan scientists 
relative to independent scientists. That said, we should note that measuring respondents’ 
support for their co-partisan scientists (the difference between two conditional AMCEs across 
subgroups: Republican and Democrats respondents) through average marginal component 
effects is based on a reference category. Therefore, the choice of reference category has 
inferential consequences in conjoint analyses. In order to show differences in preferences 
between partisan subgroups, we also directly estimate the subgroup differences using 
conditional marginal means and differences between conditional marginal means, in addition 







4.8.4 S4. Alternative Operationalization – Multidimensionality of Trust 
In understanding public perception of scientists, we also analyze trust in scientists from various 
angles (Fiske and Dupree 2014), including credibility and fairness, in addition to public 
preferences. That is, scientists can earn public’s trust in their competence or qualifications but 
not necessarily their fairness when conducting research. Hence, we distinguish general trust 
(how much would you trust Scientist A and B?) from epistemic trust (where would you place 
your assessment for this candidate’s qualifications?) and normative trust (how much would you 
agree that this potential candidate cares about the best interests of the public when conducting 
his/her research?). Measuring these three alternative dependent variables, we used a 7-point 
scale (e.g. where 7 is strongly trust and 1 is strongly mistrust) rather than a binary variable 
approach to be able to test our main findings with an alternative measurement model. Table S3 




Tables S8, S9, S10 and Figures S8 demonstrate that the majority of our main findings hold 
across all dimensions of trust albeit with reduced effect sizes. That is, while respondents trust 
natural scientists more by 3-11 percentage points relative to economists, the effects for sex and 
race/ethnicity are either muted or are negligible across all measures of trust. Given that 
respondents are less likely to trust partisan scientists relative to politically independent 
scientists across all measures of trust, the effects of partisanship become relatively smaller, but 
the effects of field of studies become more salient when respondents evaluate the 
trustworthiness of scientists based on their qualifications, namely epistemic trust. Thus, once 
scientist’s competence is the focal point in determining trustworthiness, the impact of 
partisanship becomes less salient. 
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Considering the perceived prestige of the scientific fields (4), we confirmed one of our 
hypotheses that scientists working in the fields of physics, medical and environmental science 
are perceived as more trustworthy relative to those from economics, especially in the context 
of epistemic trust. In line with the main results, we confirm another set of hypotheses that 
respondents are more likely to trust scientists working at universities, relative to scientists 
working for the government, but they are less likely to trust scientists in the industry in context 
of the normative trust. Overall, this shows that people trust natural scientists more than 
economists, and the gap becomes wider when trust is conceptualized based on competences. 
Also, people become less trusting towards scientists working for the industry when trust is 









4.8.5 S5. Additional Results (Within-design Interactions) 
Given the results in Table S11 and Figure S9, we test the hypothesis that the effect of the 
attribute "domain of work" on favouring a scientist varies across scientist’s party identification 
attribute, corresponding conditional average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and 
average component interaction effects (ACIEs) for the attribute: scientist’s party identification. 
The first three panels represent the estimated AMCEs of scientists’ domain of work, 
conditional on the scientist’s party identification. The rightmost two panels show the average 
component interaction effects (ACIEs) with respect to party identification and domain of work. 
Overall, there appear to be no substantively meaningful differences in preferences for the 
attribute "domain of work" conditional on scientist’s party identification, in reference to the 





4.8.6 S6. Marginal Means – Subgroup Preferences 
In identifying the heterogeneous treatment effects by respondent’s party identification, we have 
previously estimated the average marginal component effects of different attributes across two 
subgroups defined by party identification (Democrats and Republicans), relative to 
Independents. However, Leeper et al. (2020) shed light on an important point that conditional 
AMCEs can be substantially misleading when interpreting the degree of favoring or 
disfavoring between subgroups, since interactions are sensitive to the baseline category used 
in regression analysis. In other words, they demonstrate that the size and the direction of 
differences-in-AMCEs have negligible relationship to the underlying degree of favorability of 
the subgroups toward profiles with certain features. Following this, the baseline category 
choices can make similar preferences look dissimilar and dissimilar preferences look similar. 
Given that, we should interpret AMCEs as the difference in the size of the casual effect for 
groups, but not as a way of descriptively characterizing differences in preferences between the 
groups. Therefore, as suggested by Leeper et al. (2020), we also provide marginal means of 
both our main results and subgroup preferences by respondent’s party identification, since 
reporting marginal means enables us to demonstrate differences for all feature levels without 
being interpreted relative to the baseline categories. Overall, this provides us with an additional 
presentation of differences between group preferences. 
The results of Figure S10 confirm the main figure in the article to a large extent. However, 
when our interpretation is independent of the baseline levels, there are a couple of distinguished 
patterns that are worth mentioning. First, respondents clearly favor scientists in medical science 
more than scientists in any other discipline. Second, respondents favor scientists working at 
university and disfavor scientists working for industry the most, when the profiles lack 
scientist’s party identification attribute. Nonetheless, when the profiles include scientist’s party 
identification attribute, the favoring attitude toward university scientists became negligible, 
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while the disfavoring attitude toward scientists working for government remained meaningful. 
Third, Republican scientists are the least favorite group, while Democrat and Independent 
scientists are favored to a greater extent. Given that our sample is skewed to Democrats, we 
also provide subgroup preferences by respondent’s party identification in Figure S11. 
Accordingly, this subgroup analysis reveals important patterns. First, it confirms the previously 
reported heterogeneous treatment effects through the conditional AMCEs. That is, while 
Democrat respondents favor female scientists, Republican respondents favor male scientists. 
Furthermore, while Democrat respondents favor both environmental and medical scientists, 
Republican respondents only favor medical scientists. Another subgroup difference is that 
Democrat respondents only disapprove scientists working for industry, as well as preferring 
only scientists working at university. On the other hand, the level of favorability toward 
scientists by all attributes slightly dropped, when we introduced the attribute of scientist’s party 
identification. Following this, the results show that respondents strongly favor their co-partisan 
scientists as hypothesised. Interpreting MMs of our baseline level (Independent) in the main 
analysis, we see that Democrats prefer politically independent scientists, while Republicans 







Note: Marginal means represent the mean outcome across all appearances of a particular 
conjoint feature level, averaging across all other features. In our forced-choice conjoint design 
with two profiles per choice task, marginal means have a direct interpretation as probabilities: 
these MMs average 0.5 with values above 0.5 indicating features that increase scientist’s 










4.8.7 S7. Analysis with Entropy Balancing 
As a further robustness check, we tested that there were no other biases in our online quota 
sample that was representative of the U.S. population based on key demographic variables, 
such as age, sex, and ethnicity but politically skewed to Democrats. In order to ensure 
representativeness, we first implemented entropy balancing to weight our sample in terms of 
quota indicators: age, sex, ethnicity, and then partisan characteristics. This method adjusts 
differences in the first, second, and third moment of the covariate distributions, such as 
covariate means, variances, and skewness (for a detailed discussion, see Hainmueller and Xu 
(2013)). Tables S12, S13 and Figures S12 illustrate that we do not observe any major 
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5. Overall conclusion 
In this PhD thesis, I examined three subtopics within the research field of public understanding 
of science, namely focusing on racial disparities in civic scientific literacy, public support for 
the pro-environmental governmental policies, and public perception of scientists’ 
trustworthiness. In Chapter 2, I performed a set of multivariate linear regressions on pooled 
waves of the General Social Survey to investigate how racial social identity and racial ingroup 
evaluation shape the science literacy gap between whites and African Americans. In Chapter 
3, I used the European Social Survey Round 8 data to perform structural equation modelling 
and disentangle the relationship between public support for the welfare state and public support 
for the environmental state. Lastly, in Chapter 4 I carried out a conjoint experiment to study 
the factors of public perception of scientists’ preferability and trustworthiness. 
Two main conclusions can be derived from Chapter 2. Firstly, the analysis showed that there 
is little evidence to suggest that the salience of racial self-identification affects science literacy 
differently among whites and African Americans. Thus, the initial hypothesis about the 
malevolent image of science being deeply entrenched within the collective memory of African 
Americans and ultimately affecting their science literacy was not corroborated. Secondly, there 
is stronger yet still cautious evidence to claim that the salience of ingroup evaluation 
contributes to science literacy more positively among African Americans compared to whites, 
and this can be interpreted via the alleviation of the stereotype threat effect that African 
Americans experience with regard to their uptake of science. Another finding I did not have 
any prior expectation about is that racial self-identification and ingroup evaluation are 
negatively related to science literacy among whites, even when the educational attainments and 
other covariates are accounted for. This fact requires further scrutiny by introducing the 
dimension of value orientations in the analysis. 
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The main conclusion of Chapter 3 is that when controlling for the covariates derived from the 
Value-Belief-Norm theory there is a weak positive relationship between public support for the 
welfare state and public support for the environmental state. The latter is explained best by the 
belief in the reality of climate change, with those having a stronger belief in the existence of 
climate change expressing more support towards the government measures aimed at curbing 
its societal and economic risks. The weak effect of the welfare state support on the 
environmental state support suggests that when convincing the public in the necessity of the 
government-driven anti-climate change measures, the environmental identity argument should 
be prioritized over the etatist argument. This means that, while pointing to the responsibility of 
the state to act accordingly in relation to both short-term societal and long-term environmental 
risks might be effective to some extent in convincing people to support climate change curbing 
policies, it would be far more effective to approach this through raising public awareness about 
climate change and fostering public environmental identity. 
Finally, the research carried out in Chapter 4 showed that the topic of public trust in science 
cannot be scrutinized without acknowledging the notion of the public image of the very 
scientists in the first place. The main conclusion of the study is that when judging the 
preferability and trustworthiness of scientists, the general public appears to be very sensitive 
to their political ideology, favoring those scientists who do not express a strong political leaning 
and identify themselves as Independent rather than Democrats or Republicans. This finding 
adds to the ongoing discussion on the politicization of science and provides evidence for 
political neutrality to be a crucial component of the scientific ethos in the public eyes. 
Additionally, the research suggested that the public credibility of scientists is loosely related to 
their sex and race/ethnicity, meaning that the stereotypes surrounding gender and race play an 
insignificant role in shaping public opinion about scientists and their trustworthiness. 
Conversely, people tend to put more emphasis on the professional characteristics of scientists, 
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preferring those who come from the hard sciences over social science, and those working for 
the university over the industry. This finding confirms the tentative notion that when examining 
public opinion on science, the very concept of science should not be treated as a homogeneous 
monolithic entity as its perceived characteristics vary substantially along the dimensions of the 
scientific field and institution responsible for the knowledge production. 
Overall, three chapters of the present PhD thesis have touched upon and explored the concepts 
central to the very field of public understanding of science – science literacy, trust in scientists, 
and support for scientific policies. However, the overarching question that any research in this 
field instinctively tries to contribute to revolves around finding approaches to restoring and 
strengthening public confidence in science. Either through making fierce attempts to educate 
the public about science in the 1980s, or – how it is being done lately - by making the very 
process of academic research more transparent and accountable, the scientific institution sends 
an unambiguous message that its existence and efficiency ultimately depend on whether people 
express trust in science or not. 
We know from the previous literature that civic scientific literacy is hardly related to public 
appreciation of science and that it is engagement rather than knowledge that can drive 
improvements in how the public perceives science. While this idea looks promising and more 
effort should be aimed at making science communication two-way rather than one-way, two-
way communication is still subjected to social inequality and stratification. For example, as 
Dawson (2018) notices, while participatory mechanisms might be open to large fractions of 
society, low-income ethnic minority groups might still experience alienation from science and 
perceive it as something distant and unattainable, being beyond their control. For this social 
group, communication remains one-way, and their level of scientific knowledge could be the 
critical factor in processing scientific information. As I showed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, 
social identity factors play their role in shaping science knowledge, and more research is 
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required to map how various social identities interact with how people perceive science and 
scientific knowledge. 
Exploring public support for climate change policies from the perspective of the welfare state 
in Chapter 3, I cannot help but mention that this is also an issue that is directly linked to the 
quality of science communication. Would people be less sceptical about the need to tackle 
climate change if they were more engaged in exploring its aftermaths and being assured that 
scientists value and demand their experience? The whole situation reminds me of the famous 
case of studying mad cow disease described by Wynne and colleagues (1996), in which 
scientists disregarded a whole layer of knowledge that came from local farmers and that was 
considered redundant and worthless for the investigation. With this type of attitude, however 
straightforward and unambiguous the communication from science to people could be, it still 
would not be able to nurture trust. Mutual trust can thrive only in that kind of setting, where 
both sides respect each other’s worldview and are eager to learn from each other, rather than 
devaluating one epistemic experience, and appraising another one. 
Lastly, science-in-society cannot be imagined without direct interaction between scientists and 
citizens, either in public hearings, open debates, collaborative research, citizen science, or else. 
This framework inevitably makes the personal characteristics of scientists more salient 
compared to the times when science was separated from society, not so much on the physical 
as on the symbolic level. The question that lies on the surface is to what extent stereotyping 
can impact the credibility of scientists and whether it can potentially corrupt the very process 
of direct communication. As Chapter 4 has shown, stereotyping of scientists, if any, occurs 
along the lines of achieved rather than ascribed statuses, and what people demand most from 
scientists is not mixing their political and professional identities. This is undoubtedly 
something that academics can have control of, so being mindful about own political biases and 
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how they might impact research is an essential step towards restoring public confidence in our 
institution. 
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